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The countries of  the Latin American and Caribbean region have shown
a keen and lasting interest in mechanisms of  economic development and
public policies for its promotion. This is a process in which ECLAC has
been involved ever since its founding over half  a century ago. Today, the
debate on these issues continues against the backdrop of  a globalization
process in which the remarkable dynamism of  some dimensions –especially
its economic, financial and cultural aspects– contrasts with the slow
formation of  an institutional network capable of  coping with the increased
interdependence of  nations on various levels and of  gradually rectifying
the striking asymmetries of  the global order.
Over the past two decades, the Latin American and Caribbean region
has wagered heavily on its integration into the global economy. In fact, of
all the developing regions of  the world, it has been the most resolute in its
pursuit of economic liberalization. A review of this period brings to light
a number of  extremely important achievements, but it also reveals areas in
which the region is lagging behind and others in which unfinished business
remains. ECLAC contends that the region must build upon the progress it
has already made, but it also has to close existing gaps and address
unresolved issues. The inroads made in these areas may play a vital role in
consolidating the region’s fuller integration into the world economy and in
ensuring that the social, economic and political costs of the economic
reform process have not been incurred in vain.
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I. Basic features of  the current global environment
The 1990s saw the consolidation of  economic and financial traits which
are firmly rooted in the past. During that period, the conditions were created
that ultimately allowed the world economy to evolve from an aggregate of
national economies linked by trade, investment and financing flows into a
set of  global market and production networks that span national borders.
While this process is undoubtedly an increasingly powerful one, it has not
been accompanied by an equivalent development of  global institutions,
whose agenda is incomplete and asymmetrical (Ocampo, Bajraj and Martin,
2001).
1. Major economic events
Against a backdrop of  slower global growth, international trade
expanded at rates of  close to 6% per year between 1990 and 2003; foreign
direct investment (FDI) verged on US$ 1.4 trillion in 2000 (a sevenfold
increase over the early 1990s), and transactions on currency markets have
totalled over US$ 1.5 trillion per day in the early years of  this century.
Meanwhile, innovation and technological change have become even more
concentrated in the developed countries.
(a) Slackening global economic growth
Between 1990 and 2003, world economic growth averaged just 2.6%
per year, the lowest level for any equivalent period since the Second World
War. This result reflected the lacklustre performance of  the developed
countries, the crisis in Eastern Europe and sluggish growth in Africa and
in Latin America and the Caribbean. By contrast, Asia grew swiftly and




Annual growth rates, selected periods
(Average annual rates)
Devel-
World Developed oping Latin Africa Asia Middle Eastern
countries coun- America East Europe
tries
1950-1960 4.4 4.1 5.1 4.9 4.5 5.7 5.7 9.2
1960-1973 5.1 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.2 7.7 6.7
1973-1980 3.4 3.1 5.1 5.1 3.5 6.2 4.4 4.6
1980-1990 3.2 3.2 3.7 1.6 2.6 7.0 1.6 2.4
1990-2003 2.6 2.3 4.4 2.7 2.8 6.0 3.3 -0.3
Per capita
1950-1960 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.0 3.6 2.9 8.2
1960-1973 3.1 4.1 3.0 3.3 2.5 2.9 4.8 5.5
1973-1980 1.6 2.3 2.9 2.4 0.3 4.3 1.4 3.7
1980-1990 1.5 2.4 1.7 -0.4 0.1   5.1 -1.6 1.7
1990-2003 1.2 1.7 2.7 1.0 0.4 4.5 1.1 -0.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of data from various official international sources.
Within the group of  developed countries, the performance of  the
United States in 1990-2003 (annual average growth of  3%, with the rate
picking up to over 4% in 1997-1999) contrasted sharply with the results
posted by the European Union (2% per year) and Japan (an average annual
growth of  1%, with negative rates being recorded in 1991 and 1998).  These
trends in the developed countries were accompanied by major
macroeconomic imbalances. In the United States, rising expenditure and
the downturn in fiscal revenues triggered by tax cuts and an economic
recession turned the fiscal surplus of  the 1990s into a hefty deficit, thereby
raising the problem of  the “twin deficit” once again. Meanwhile, in the
European Union, other events were overshadowed by the historic entry of
10 new members into the European Union on 1 May 2004.
The developing countries, including the transition economies of
Eastern Europe, entered the 1990s with sharply differing growth rates.
The most dynamic countries in 1990-2003 were those of  South-East Asia,
China and India. With the exception of  Indonesia, the countries of  South-
East Asia recovered rapidly from the 1997 crisis, while China more than
tripled its output over this period (226%) and India virtually doubled its
GDP (98.1%). China’s remarkable growth has made it the world’s third-
largest importer, behind the European Union and the United States.
Meanwhile, from 1996 onward, the transition economies have returned to
a growth path which has tended to stabilize at around 4% in the early years
of  the present decade. After its poor performance of  the early 1990s, Africa
has been growing fairly steadily at about 3% per year since 1994. Like the
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Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean performed better in the
first half of  the 1990s than in the second and particularly since 1997; in
fact, in 1999 and 2001, output declined sharply.
(b) Exports and economic growth: a changeable relationship
In 1990-2003, world trade once again attained annual growth rates
similar to those of  the first two decades of  the post-war period, following
a sharp slowdown between 1973 and 1990. Since world output growth
rates fell at the same time, the ratio between the two variables in 1990-2003
was the highest since the Second World War, with exports growing almost
three times as fast as output (see figure 1). In fact, exports grew faster than
output every year from 1985 to 2000. Increasing trade liberalization in
manufacturing and services, together with the rising volume of  intra-firm
trade being fueled by the dynamics of  international systems of  integrated
production, are one of  the reasons for this gap between the growth rates
for world trade and GDP (UNCTAD, 2002a).1
1 Something similar, although less marked, had already happened between 1960 and
1973, when, as a result of a steep rise in intra-industry trade in Western Europe,




TOTAL WORLD export and GDP growth rates, 1950-2003
(Percentages and multiples)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of
data from various official international sources.
This tendency was more pronounced in developed economies than
developing ones and, among the latter, much stronger in Latin America
and the Caribbean than in the Asian economies. In fact, Latin American
and Caribbean exports expanded, on average, around 3.5 times as fast as
GDP between 1990 and 2003, while the ratio was 1.4 in Taiwan Province
of  China, 1.6 in China and 1.8 in the Republic of  Korea and India. Trade
liberalization was particularly vigorous in Latin America and the Caribbean
in the 1990s, while a number of  Asian economies had already opened up
to international trade in previous decades.
Rapid economic growth has been more and more closely associated
with export success, but strong export performances have been seen within
a wide range of  different trade policy frameworks. In point of  fact, no
robust relationship has been observed between export growth and trade
liberalization. By the same token, rapid growth in developing countries has
taken place in the presence of  different combinations of  economic
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The composition of  world trade in terms of  different categories of
goods has changed substantially in recent years (UNCTAD, 2002). Table 2
divides goods into dynamic and non-dynamic, or stagnant, products (i.e.,
those growing faster and slower than average, respectively) and indicates
their relative importance based on a world trade classification developed
by ECLAC, which highlights the intensity of  natural resource and
technology use.2
Table 2
DYNAMIC AND STAGNANT PRODUCTS IN WORLD IMPORTS,
BY TECHNOLOGICAL CATEGORY, 1985 AND 2000
(Percentages of total imports)
Dynamic products Stagnant products Net
in-
Number Number crease
of 1985 2000 Increase of 1985 2000 Decrease or de-
items (1) (2) A=(2)-(1) items (3) (4) B=(4)-(3) crease
(A-B)
Commodities 15 0.7 0.8 0.1 132 22.5 11.6 -10.9 -10.8
Natural-resource-
based manufactures 65 5.3 6.8 1.6 134 14.3 8.9 -5.4 -3.8
Low-technology
manufactures 71 7.3 10.8 3.5 90 7.1 4.9 -2.2 1.3
Mid-level technology
manufactures 91 16.7 21.1 4.4 111 11.8 8.6 -3.3 1.1
High-technology
manufactures 45 9.5 21.6 12.2 21 2.2 1.3 -0.9 11.3
Unclassified products 4 1.4 2.8 1.4 7 1.4 0.9 -0.5 0.8
Total 291 40.8 63.9 23.1 495 59.2 36.1 -23.1 0.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of the Competitive Analysis of Nations (CAN) program, 2001, and the International
Commodity Trade Data Base (COMTRADE).
Commodities are strikingly non-dynamic, as are natural-resource-based
manufactures, largely as a result of  protectionist practices in the developed
world. What is more, these practices, together with growing competition
in the market, have helped drive down commodity prices (Ocampo and
Parra, 2003). Manufactures based on the use of  high technology have been
far more dynamic than the rest, increasing their share by more than 11
percentage points.
2 This ECLAC (1992) classification groups items at the four-digit level of the Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC).
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(c)  The global leadership of  transnational corporations
The appearance of  new technologies and the rapid advancement of
existing ones have significantly altered the way production is organized
within companies, production sectors and, ultimately, the world economy.
Although global conglomerates and oligopolies are not new to the world
economy, what is new is the increase in the number of  sectors where they
have become the standard way of  organizing production; this is particularly
the case in industries involving a great deal of  technological research and
development (R&D) and in manufacturing enterprises that make use of
large economies of  scale. In this context, coordination of  the entire
production chain is a key source of  competitive advantages, and for this
reason the network is used as a strategic asset.
Transnational corporations have been the most dynamic economic
agents in this move towards the creation of  global oligopolies in more and
more sectors and activities, as these types of  companies have been able to
react the fastest to changes in the way production is organized and have
succeeded in capitalizing on their competitive advantages to organize
international systems of  integrated production. The expansion of
transnational corporations has fueled a rapid increase in foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows which has been accompanied, to differing degrees
depending on the sector and the region of  the world, by intense merger
and acquisition activity.  This global integration of  production is being
driven by some 64,000 transnational corporations that control over 870,000
foreign subsidiaries. Operating at a supranational level, with capital flows
and a capital formation capacity that are worldwide in scope, transnational
corporations are both the main architects and the chief  beneficiaries of
globalization.
From the vantage point of  developing countries, transnational
corporations are viewed in two ways: quantitatively, with the emphasis on
FDI and on external financing as seen from a balance-of-payments
perspective; and qualitatively, with the focus being on the contribution
they may make to productive development in host countries.3  A useful
way of  reconciling these sometimes conflicting outlooks is to analyse the
corporate strategies that lead transnational corporations to invest in
developing countries (ECLAC, 2004).
3 This contribution may include the establishment of new activities to improve the quality
of linkages with the world economy; access to new technologies, their transfer and
assimilation; the development and deepening of production linkages; human resources
training; and development of local entrepreneurial capabilities.
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There are four main motivations underlying the production of  goods
and the provision of  services. The empirical evidence appears to suggest
that the various regions of  the developing world have taken different (passive
or active) approaches to the use of  these corporate strategies based on
their comparative advantages. This, in turn, has led to significant differences
in the sectoral composition of  FDI in the various regions, with FDI stocks
being concentrated in the primary sector in Africa, in manufacturing in
Asia and in services in Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure 2).
Figure 2
SECTORAL SPECIALIZATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN DEVELOPINC cOUNTRIES
Source:World Bank, Global Development Finance 2004: Harnessing Cyclical Gains for
Development, Washington, D.C., 2004.
Striking similarities are also beginning to emerge in trade and
investment links. Regional and bilateral trade agreements are gradually being
converted into investment agreements and, in a number of  cases,
agreements on double taxation (UNCTAD, 2003). These arrangements
place greater restrictions on the treatment of  transnational corporations
than those agreed to in multilateral negotiations.
(d)  The predominance of  financial capital and the volatility of  capital flows
The growth of  international trade and FDI has been accompanied by
an expansion of  international financial flows, which have come to play a
dominant role in the world economy.  International economic transactions
























GDP but more slowly than bank credit and much more slowly than
international bond placements. The increase in the stock of  outstanding
financial derivatives, meanwhile, has been much sharper, although not all
of  these instruments correspond to international transactions (see table
3).  Globalized financial capital seems to have become increasingly detached
from the real economy, even though, theoretically, its function is to finance
that sector of  the economy. The provision of  financing to non-financial
agents creates the base for an inverted pyramid of  derivatives that swell
the assets and liabilities of  intermediaries and offer financial investors a
multitude of  investment options that are entirely divorced from real
investment and commercial transactions.
Table 3
ECONOMIC, TRADE AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS, 1990-2003




Developed-country bank assets in the rest of the world a 8.3
International bond issues a 15.0
Financial derivatives (options and futures) a 22.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of official figures from the countries and from the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and  Bank for
International Settlements (BIS).
a  Figures refer to year-end stocks.
Volatility and contagion have been two of  the inherent characteristics
of  this rapid financial development process. Volatility is not a new
phenomenon, but certain features of  today’s markets have tended to heighten
it. These include, firstly, insufficient regulation of  the agents operating in
financial markets and the procyclical nature of  existing regulatory systems.
Secondly, problems of  contagion have been associated with an inadequate
supply of  information on emerging markets, a situation which appears to be
at least partially attributable to geographic proximity, the level of  trade and
the similarity of  economic policies. Thirdly, the fact that different agents use
the same risk assessment system and employ a short time horizon in its
application tends to intensify the bandwagon effect, which is further
compounded by the procyclical behaviour of  risk rating agencies (ECLAC, 2001).
In the 1990s, unlike previous decades, FDI and short- and medium-
or long-term private sources provided most of  the financing for developing
countries, chiefly through bond issues. Broadly speaking, FDI followed an
upward trend up to 2000 and behaved less procyclically (see figure 3).
PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN OPEN ECONOMIES
12
Figure 3
NET FINANCIAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of World Bank, Global Development Finance 2003: Striving for Stability in Development
Finance, Washington, D.C., April 2003
In marked contrast to FDI, sources of  short- and medium- or long-
term private financing have been subject to fluctuations, and financing
conditions have been highly sensitive to the ups and downs of  international
markets. Portfolio equity flows and placements of  American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) exhibited the greatest instability. Unlike FDI, these other
sources of  finance, as a group, were strikingly procyclical in 1990-2003
(Ffrench-Davis and Ocampo, 2001).
(e) The concentration of  innovation and technical progress
The intensification of  product and process R&D and the development
of  worldwide brands have also increased companies’ fixed costs. Thus,
economies of  scale in R&D and in marketing have combined with economies
of  scale in production, and global producers are now struggling to win
sufficiently large market shares to cover their fixed costs. Furthermore,
economies of  agglomeration tend to lead to a geographic polarization of
the most dynamic activities. These phenomena must be understood in order
to comprehend how the world economy of  today works. They also play a
substantial role in the accentuation of  the productive and technological
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First of  all, the developed countries account for 84.4% of  gross R&D
expenditure and a somewhat smaller percentage of  scientific researchers
and engineers (see table 4). Other indicators provide an even more glaring
picture of  the asymmetries existing between developed and developing
countries: the ratio of  gross R&D expenditure per capita is 19:1; the ratio
of  scientific researchers and engineers per capita is 7:1; and gross R&D
expenditure per researcher is more than double. It should be noted,
nonetheless, that there are also striking disparities within the developing
world itself, with the new industrial economies of  Asia standing out from
the rest. Be this as it may, not only are R&D as such concentrated in the
developed countries, but so are the sectors and production activities that
are most closely linked to technological change.  These activities are highly
dynamic elements within the production structure and world trade and are
a source of  large innovation rents.
Table 4
WORLDWIDE DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT (R&D) ACTIVITIES, 1996-1997
Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) Researchers GERD
per
Groupings and countries Amount Per Per researcher(billions % world % of capita Number % of million (thousands
of PPP GERD GDP (PPP (thou- world inhab- of PPP
dollars)a dollars) sands) total itants dollars
World 547 100.0 1.8 100 5 189 100.0 946 105
-Developed countries 461 84.4 2.2 377 3 713 71.6 3 033 124
-Developing countries 86 15.6 0.6 20 1 476 28.4 347 58
-United States 199 36.4 2.6 750 981 18.9 3 697 203
-European Union 138 25.2 1.9 370 825 15.9 2 211 167
-Japan 83 15.2 2.8 661 817 15.8 6 498 102
-Russian Federation 6 1.0 0.9 39 562 10.8 3 802 10
-Central and Eastern
Europe 6 1.0 0.8 49 168 3.2 1 451 33
-Latin America 17 3.1 0.5 34 348 6.7 715 48
-New industrial economies
of Asia 27 4.9 1.1 66 241 4.6 595 111
-China 21 3.9 0.6 17 552 10.6 454 38
-India 11 2.0 0.7 11 143 2.8 151 76
-Africa 4 0.7 0.3 6 132 2.5 211 29
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The
State of Science and Technology in the World, 1996-1997, Montreal, UNESCO Institute
for Statistics (UIS), 2001.
a
 Purchasing power parity dollars.
Secondly, technological change in the developed world affects
developing countries in many ways, such as the transfer to developing
countries of  production sectors that are considered to be technologically
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mature in developed countries; the transfer of  technology as such, including
technologies that are embedded in production equipment; and the possible
participation of  developing countries in the more dynamic production
activities and sectors.  All these mechanisms are subject to constraints or
costs, however, including the low profit margins and protectionism existing
in mature industrial sectors; the fact that technology transfers may be subject
to the payment of  innovation rents, which are increasingly protected by
the universalization of  strict rules on the protection of  intellectual property;
and the possibility that developing countries’ opportunities to participate
in highly dynamic sectors may be largely confined to low-skill activities.
The combined effect of  all these factors explains why major
asymmetries continue to exist at the world level: the marked concentration
of  technical progress in the developed countries, these countries’ continuing
dominance in the registration of  intellectual property in the most dynamic
sectors of  international trade and their hegemonic influence over the
creation of  large transnational corporations.  Thus, the economic
opportunities of  developing countries continue to be largely determined
by the position they occupy in the international hierarchy.
2.  International regimes
Globalization has given rise not only to growing interdependence, but
also to sharp inequalities across countries. This is attributable to the fact
that economic processes have been allowed to follow their course without
consideration for the various countries’ differing resources and possibilities.
What is more, in addition to the failure to pay due attention to the inequalities
existing at the outset of the process with a view to creating a more equitable
world, in many cases developing countries have found themselves on what
amounts to an essentially uneven playing field. Today’s globalization process
thus calls for new institutions to reconcile a more efficient management of
global interdependence with the adoption of  clearly defined principles of
international solidarity. Only thus will it be possible to ensure that
globalization “becomes a positive force for all the world’s people”, as stated
in the Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000).
Major obstacles stand in the way of  the creation of  a new institutional
structure, however: the lack of  shared principles among the main
stakeholders, the unequal influence exerted by those participating in the
process and the difficulty of creating stable coalitions as a basis for
addressing the various issues. This situation is compounded by the central
paradox of  the current globalization process, i.e., the contrast between
problems of  global scope and the lack of  any genuine internationalization
of  political affairs (Ocampo and Martin, 2003). The current status of  the
ECLAC 2004
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multilateral debate on a number of  issues of  particular importance for the
definition of  productive development strategies in open economies will be
discussed in the following sections.
(a) Macroeconomic and financial regimes
The uncertainty stemming from the South-East Asian crisis of  1997,
together with the perception that the international financial architecture
was not fully equipped to deal with it, set the stage for a political debate
concerning the macroeconomic dimensions of  the crisis and its implications
for the promotion of  development and the eradication of  poverty (United
Nations, 1999 and 2001). This prompted ECLAC to highlight the value of
macroeconomic and financial stability as a global public good and to
underscore the need to correct the asymmetries of  the world economy in
this respect (ECLAC, 2002).
International macroeconomic and financial stability is a global public
good that generates positive externalities for all international market
participants and averts the negative externalities associated with contagion,
both during booms and at times of  financial panic or when recessionary
forces come to the fore. This explains the importance of  certain global
processes that are taking place on various fronts.
Firstly, the lack of  mechanisms for dealing with the effects that the
major economies’ macroeconomic policies have on the rest of  the world is
a basic failing of  the current international order.
The second front on which action is called for is the preventive
macroeconomic surveillance of  all economies and the drafting of  codes
of  good practice. Major strides have been made in recent years in the areas
of  crisis prevention and the creation of  early-warning vulnerability
indicators, in addition to the adoption of  codes of  good macroeconomic
management practices. Many developing countries are finding some of
these standards to be very complex and difficult to implement, however.
Consequently, they are asking for the gradual and differentiated
implementation of  such standards and are emphasizing the need for
international support and technical assistance.
The third front in the effort to secure global macroeconomic stability
is the formulation of  international standards for the prudential regulation
and supervision of  financial markets and the provision of  better market
information. With this aim in mind, it is hoped that improvements along a
number of  these lines can be made in the proposals formulated by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision concerning the drafting of  a
new agreement (Basel II) for entry into force by late 2006.
Apart from the systemic issues related to global macroeconomic and
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financial stability, international efforts should focus on the gradual
correction of  macroeconomic and financial asymmetries in the world
economic system. The primary objectives here are to make access to
international financial resources less segmented and volatile for developing
countries and to give these countries greater scope for the adoption of
countercyclical macroeconomic policies.
In order to upgrade existing mechanisms for the provision of  liquidity
in crisis situations, the International Monetary Fund should gradually
broaden its role as an international lender of  last resort. The provision of
liquidity should be supplemented by a system for resolving debt overhangs,
for which no international arrangements have yet been established. In recent
years progress has been achieved in some related areas, but apart from the
specific inroads made in the bond market (collective action clauses) and
the Paris Club (government creditors), the IMF effort to develop a
comprehensive statutory approach to solvency problems has not garnered
the necessary support. The proposed sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism was strongly opposed by private financial institutions on the
grounds that it would have constrained their negotiating capacity and made
it easier for borrower countries to default.
Another important sphere of  action is the strengthening of  multilateral
banking and development cooperation. Multilateral development banking
often complements the role played by IMF in supplying liquidity, as well as
performing other critical functions, such as stimulating innovative activities
(particularly in the area of  social development) and private-sector
participation in infrastructure projects, supporting the expansion of  financial
systems and especially of  national development banks in developing
countries and providing technical assistance in general.
At the International Conference on Financing for Development held
by the United Nations in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, the international
community made a commitment to strengthen international financial
cooperation for the relatively less developed countries. Although the efforts
made after that conference in respect of  official development assistance
(ODA) and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt reduction
initiative were noteworthy, the increase in ODA made by donor countries
still falls far short of  the US$ 100 billion per year that would be needed to
meet the United Nations Millennium Goals (United Nations, 2004).
The HIPC Initiative has also proved difficult to implement. Late in
2003 a group of  27 countries reached the HIPC decision point and became
eligible for debt relief  measures that reduced their debt by about two thirds
of  its net present value. Only eight countries in the group, among them
Bolivia, also reached the completion point and thus left the programme.
ECLAC 2004
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Nonetheless, there is no certainty that countries that reach the completion
point have actually reduced their debt to a sustainable level.
The last piece in this overall picture is the negotiation of  a new
international agreement on the scope of  conditionality with a view to making
a firm sense of  ownership of  macroeconomic and development policies
an integral part of  international practice. The progress made in this area
includes the analysis and discussion of  the issue in the International
Monetary Fund in 2001. Nevertheless, in some cases, advocacy of  a sense
of  policy ownership actually conceals new forms of  conditionality; this
underlines the need for an explicit international agreement on the subject.4
(b) Trade negotiations
The Fourth Ministerial Conference of  WTO, held in Doha in
November 2001, ushered in a new round of  negotiations, which should be
completed by January 2005. Developing countries played a key role in
defining the programme of  work, which places priority on reducing the
asymmetries between the rights and obligations of  member countries
(currently 148 in number). This position is based on the orientation of  the
multilateral trading system, in evidence ever since the Uruguay Round,
towards establishing a homogeneous regulatory framework that disregards
the asymmetries existing in the world economy (Ocampo and Martin, 2003).
As the globalization process has proceeded, the scope of  international
trade negotiations has been extending far beyond conventional provisions
governing cross-border transactions of  merchandise to encompass more
and more issues that were formerly addressed soley within a national policy
setting. As a result, negotiations now have to be approached in a far more
comprehensive and consistent way than before while covering a wide variety
of issues
To succeed with this systemic approach, developing countries will have
to build the necessary institutional capabilities to design and implement
appropriate, coherent policies on various fronts and will need to allocate
large amounts of  public funds that are needed for other purposes.  The
Doha Round covers 21 issues.  These issues are divided into eight groups,
six of  which form part of  the “single undertaking” established in the
Uruguay Round. In accordance with this principle, uncontroversial subjects
are tied to the success or failure of  negotiations on issues about which the
member countries hold sharply differing positions.
4 For some recent suggestions regarding this subject, see Rodrik and Subramanian  (2003).
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The texts that came out of  Doha have given rise to a development
programme that reaffirms the principle of  special and differentiated
treatment and includes commitments regarding cooperation and training
in developing countries, particularly the least developed ones.
The development programme’s agenda gives a prominent place to
analysis of  the countries’ scope for adopting development policies,
particularly as regards export diversification. The Uruguay Round
significantly reduced the opportunities for middle-income countries to use
national policies to promote exports and strengthen their links with national
productive development. As in other fields, the agreements authorize types
of  subsidies that are used more in developed countries (for technology,
subnational development, the environment) while restricting those used
more often in developing nations (export processing zones, direct subsidies
for export activities and performance agreements).
For the most part, the work undertaken as a result of  the Doha Round
has not proceeded as originally intended. Overall, asymmetries in the progress
of  the negotiations can be seen on two different levels. Firstly, few advances
have been made in relation to subjects of  interest to developing countries,
such as agriculture and rules on antidumping and subsidies.  This stands in
contrast to the more rapid progress seen in discussions on investment, services
and further liberalization of  trade in industrial products. Secondly, there is
an almost complete absence of  progress in the specific tasks defined as part
of  the “development dimension”.
At the Fifth Ministerial Conference of  WTO, held in Cancún in 2003,
the greatest difficulties arose in the areas of  agriculture, market access for
non-agricultural goods and the four “Singapore issues”. The situation was
compounded by the consideration of  a number of  other issues relating to
the development agenda, including special and differentiated treatment
for developing countries and problems with implementation, on which no
significant consensus was reached.
In addition to the obvious difficulties encountered in reaching
significant multilateral agreements, there have been a number of  other
disturbing developments. One such development is the expiration of  the
deadlines for various transitory regimes, which threatens to leave a series
of  important issues in an indeterminate status for an indefinite period of
time.5  Another is the proliferation of  regional and bilateral treaties, some
of  which involve both developed and developing countries (see figure 4).
5 One case in point is the non-actionable subsidies that expired in 1999 and the “peace




PREFERENTIAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, 1948-2003
(Number of agreements notified to WTO)
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The
State of Science and Technology in the World, 1996-1997, Montreal, Institute of
Statistics, 2001.
a
 Includes the free trade agreements on goods (GATT Art. XXIV), services (GATS Art. V) and
the Enabling Clause (regional integration among developing countries) notified and in force
as of December 2003.
Given the current state of  affairs, developing countries are faced with
some difficult choices. On the one hand, it is usually better to continue
negotiating than to sign a disadvantageous agreement and, in fact, the
firmness shown by the G20+ countries in Cancún is a step forward, since
it is the first time that developing countries have wielded some measure of
power in multilateral negotiations. On the other hand, the paralyzation of
these multilateral negotiations fits in with the strategy of  the developed
countries, particularly the United States and the European Union, which
continue to sign free trade agreements with countries or regions in the
developing world covering many issues about which there is no multilateral
consensus. For many developing countries, signing a free trade agreement
in order to increase and stabilize their access to developed-country markets
is a high-priority objective, and this also falls into line with this trend. There
is a risk that these agreements could undermine the negotiating parties’
determination to move the international negotiations forward on significant
issues while at the same time siphoning off the already scarce supply of
technical resources from these negotiations.
(b) Environmental sustainability
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(the “Earth Summit” held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992) was a landmark
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This meeting marked a turning point in the negotiation of  multilateral
agreements on sustainable development, since it was there that a broad
view of  development was adopted which recognized the importance of
reconciling economic production and international trade with sustainable
natural resources use and environmental protection.
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg,
South Africa, 2002), the political commitments of the Rio Declaration
were reaffirmed, particularly the principle of  common but differentiated
responsibilities and the precautionary principle. Furthermore, the 34 targets
agreed to at the Summit complement the commitments previously
established in respect of  the development goals set forth in the United
Nations Millennium Declaration. This was also the first time that recognition
was given to the importance of  specific regional initiatives and of
cooperation among public-sector, private-sector and civil society actors
through voluntary partnerships.
The global agenda being shaped by current international debates covers
a number of  important issues (ECLAC, 2003; United Nations, 2002;
ECLAC/UNEP, 2001). First, it stresses the need to alter certain
unsustainable patterns of  consumption and production in both developed
and developing countries. In this area, energy efficiency is unquestionably
one of  the most important items on the agenda. The Kyoto Protocol is the
multilateral instrument par excellence for pursuing this strategy, while the
regional mechanism set up by the European Union (the “Eurokyoto”) is
the first concrete example of  a global environmental services market.
A second important issue is the sustainable management of  ecosystems
and biological diversity. What is needed in this case is an alliance to uphold
a world commitment to conserve biodiversity in situ, preserve important
ecosystems and prevent their degradation. This global alliance should be
formed within a framework that combines the principles of  global
management for the protection of  land and marine environments. In order
for these initiatives to be implemented effectively, a global compensation
fund should be set up to finance the conservation and restoration of
ecosystems; recognition of  the environmental services provided by natural
ecosystems should be part of  this framework.
It is also important to encourage countries to ratify the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety so that it can enter into force. The importance of
biotechnology in building competitiveness should not blind the countries to
the need to use the approved mechanisms for analysing the risk that genetically
modified organisms could pose to biodiversity. To develop these multilateral
mechanisms, it will be necessary to consolidate operational approaches for
mobilizing the global resources needed to tackle global problems in accordance
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with the principle of  common but differentiated responsibilities. Steps should
be taken to explore opportunities for taxing activities of  international scope
that are potentially damaging to the world environment. These tax revenues
could then be used to set up specific funds for solving these problems at a
multilateral level based on the “polluter pays” principle.
There is also a need for greater coherence and compatibility between
the world trading system, including intellectual property protection, and
sustainable development. The Doha Declaration clearly specifies that
countries may take steps to protect human and animal health, plant life
and the environment, providing that the measures they use to do so are
not disguised forms of  trade discrimination or protectionism. In addition,
analysis of  the effects of  environmental measures on market access,
particularly in the case of  developing countries, is identified as a priority
issue for the Trade and Environment Committee, as is the analysis of  the
main provisions of  the agreement on intellectual property protection and
environmental labelling.
(c) International migration
International migration has become one of  the most delicate issues in
the international arena in recent years owing to growing concern about
references to its consequences in developed countries. Nevertheless, the
inclusion of  migration on the international agenda is an important
component of  an international system designed to overcome the
asymmetries of  the world order. Asymmetrical market liberalization has
regressive effects at the world level, since it benefits the more mobile factors
of production (capital and skilled labour) and is detrimental to the less
mobile ones (low-skilled labour).
As ECLAC has emphasized in recent years, there is still a crucial need
for global agreements on migration if  a democratic, shared and sustainable
contemporary agenda concerning this phenomenon is to be achieved. These
agreements need to replace approaches aimed at controlling migration with
provisions that are more closely attuned to the dynamics of  labour markets
and the protection of  individual rights (ECLAC, 2002).
The lack of  an international framework for the governance of
migration increases the risk of  exclusion, discrimination and abuse of
human rights, particularly in the case of  undocumented migration, which
continues to increase as methods for evading controls on the entry and
residence of  foreigners proliferate. One extreme situation is the traffic in
persons, with the most serious manifestation of  this phenomenon being
the exploitation of  minors. This phenomenon underscores the ethical
imperative of  protecting human rights and the need for the relevant
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international instruments to be ratified or, where they have already been
adopted, fully implemented.
The governance of  international migration needs to include
improvements in the remittances market (one of  the most visible
manifestations of  contemporary migration), the creation of  innovative
mechanisms that take advantage of  the continued development of
communications media to link countries of  origin with their emigrants,
and gender mainstreaming, especially in view of  the fact that a majority of
migrants are women. Remittances to developing and transition countries
are estimated to have totalled about US$ 93 billion in 2003, with a third of
this sum going to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly
Mexico (see table 5).
Table 5
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF REMITTANCES, 2001-2003
(Billions of dollars)
Increase
Region 2001 2002 2003 2001-2003
(percentages)
East Africa and the Pacific 13.7 17.0 17.6 28.9
Europe and Central Asia 10.2 10.3 10.4 1.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 22.9 26.8 29.6 29.3
Middle East and North Africa 13.2 13.0 13.0 -1.2
South Africa 13.1 16.9 18.2 38.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.5
Total 77.1 88.1 93.0 20.7
Source:World Bank, Global Development Finance 2004: Harnessing Cyclical Gains for
Development, Washington, D.C., April 2004.
Despite its size, the family remittances market is very imperfect, with
high and variable transfer costs and asymmetrical participation by agents.
The lack of  policies for stimulating or orienting the productive utilization
of  family remittances minimizes their effect on the recipient communities.
Although less significant in quantitative terms, collective remittances are
potentially a very important pool of  resources, depending on the relevant
communities’ capacity for their generation and utilization and on the role
they play as a transnational link.
One disturbing aspect of  international migration is the part it plays in
selectively draining off  skilled human resources, thereby heightening the
already deep asymmetries between developed and developing countries in
terms of  their research and development capabilities. Two factors combine
to increase migration flows of  skilled personnel. One is the rising returns
and substantial externalities of  knowledge creation, which give rise to a
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concentration of  scientific communities. The other factor is the migration
policies implemented by developed countries in response to the growing
demand for highly skilled personnel.6  The policy inaction of  developing
countries in the face of  this long-standing problem, which is perceived to
be of  growing importance, stands in striking contrast to these policies.
II. Stylized facts related to the region’s recent development
Although the reform effort is usually associated with the 1990s,
experiments in economic liberalization began in the 1970s in the Southern
Cone (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) and, to a lesser extent, in other
countries as well. Between 1982 and 1985, following the debt crisis, many
of  the reforms included in liberalization programmes were halted and, in
some cases, were even reversed. From 1985 onward, a wave of  economic
reform began to sweep across virtually the entire region. The liberalization
of  trade and of  national financial markets were the first reforms to become
widespread in the region. Liberalization of  international capital flows
followed, beginning in 1991. Thus, a significant convergence was seen
among these three areas of  reform starting in the second half  of  the 1990s.
In contrast, there has been less convergence in the areas of  privatization
and tax reform (Ocampo, Bajraj and Martin, 2001).
1. More open trade
One of  the most salient events of  the reform period was the dramatic
and widespread liberalization of  trade in the region’s economies. Openness
coefficients increased considerably between 1980-1983 and 2000-2003, as
shown in figure 5. All of  the region’s economies are significantly more
open today than they were at the beginning of  the 1980s, with the regional
average for this indicator more than doubling. The two economies that
were least open in the 1980s (Argentina and Brazil) have not changed in
that respect, however, while Colombia, Peru and Uruguay, which were above
the regional average, are now below that average. The remaining countries
–especially the smaller ones– were, and are, more open than the regional
average. Mexico is particularly noteworthy for having quintupled its
openness coefficient during the period in question.
6 The main pole of attraction is the United States, which in the 1990s received almost a
million developing-country specialists in the area of information technology alone under
the special H1-B visa programme. A number of other OECD countries (Australia, Germany,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom) have also implemented selective programmes
along the lines of Germany’s “green card” scheme (Solimano, 2002).
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Figure 5
latin america and the caribbean: changes in trade LIBERALIZATION,
1980-1983 and 2000-2003
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of official figures from the countries.
Notes: - The openness coefficients have been calculated as  ½(X+M)/GDP, at constant
1995 prices.
- Ar: Argentina; Bo: Bolivia; Br: Brazil; Cl: Chile; Co: Colombia; Cr: Costa Rica; Ec:
Ecuador; Sv: El Salvador; Gt: Guatemala; Ht: Haiti; Hn: Honduras; Mx: Mexico; Ni:
Nicaragua; Pa: Panama; Py: Paraguay; Pe: Peru; Do: Dominican Republic; Uy:
Uruguay; Ve: Venezuela.
Both exports and imports showed robust growth. The physical volume
of  exports grew at an unprecedented rate between 1991 and 2000 (9.3%
annually), which was above the world average and was exceeded only by
the rates posted by China and India. The problems in the international
economy in 2001-2002 interrupted this growth, which began to recover,
however, in 2003. While Mexico’s exports, which represented almost half
the regional total, helped to boost the regional average, Brazil’s modest
export performance up to 2000 had the opposite effect. Most of  the
remaining countries experienced strong export growth, in the







































Meanwhile, imports increased even more than exports (ECLAC, 2004).
The main reason for this was the swift, broad-based reduction of  tariffs
against a fairly generalized background of  local currency appreciation, which
made imports less expensive. In addition, there was a rising trend in the
purchase of  foreign inputs and services by export firms and service
providers. This was especially notable among transnational firms that have
international supplier networks. At the same time, the restructuring of
businesses oriented to the domestic market, when successful, required
growing imports of  capital and intermediate goods, as well as technological
services. Finally –since openness operates in both directions– a process
occurred in which locally produced consumer goods were replaced by
imported items.
Performance by country shows a strong relation between rates of
increase in exports and GDP growth, in that the countries with the fastest
growth are the ones that most increased their exports (see figure 6).7  It
should be emphasized that all the current patterns of  export specialization
in the region included both success stories and cases of more mediocre
performance. This contradicts the “curse of  natural resources” postulate
and runs counter to the well-known secular trend towards the worsening
of  terms of  trade for commodities. Chile is the most conspicuous example
of  such a case. Despite its specialization in natural-resource-based exports,
it maintained high GDP and export growth. This contrasts with the poor
performance of  Ecuador and Venezuela, whose exports are also heavily
dependent on natural resources. Mexico has benefited little, in terms of
economic growth, from its notable success in expanding and diversifying
its exports. Costa Rica, El Salvador and, especially, the Dominican Republic
have achieved greater synchronicity between export performance and
economic growth (Ocampo, 2004).
7 The exceptions are Panama and Paraguay, in which service exports predominate.
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Figure 6
Relation between export growth and Gdp growth, 1990-2003
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of official figures from the countries.
Note: Ar: Argentina; Bo: Bolivia; Br: Brazil; Cl: Chile; Co: Colombia; Cr: Costa Rica; Ec: Ecuador;
Sv: El Salvador; Gt: Guatemala; Ht: Haiti; Hn: Honduras; Mx: Mexico; Ni: Nicaragua; Pa:
Panama; Py: Paraguay; Pe: Peru; Do: Dominican Republic; Uy: Uruguay; Ve: Venezuela.
In macroeconomic terms, these changes, in the aggregate, led to a
structural worsening of  the relation between growth and the trade balance.
Trade deficits in 1990-2000 rose to levels comparable to those of  the 1970s,
but with rates of  GDP growth nearly three percentage points lower.
Contributing to the structural deterioration was the weakness of  the linkages
between exports and the rest of  the production system, as well as the
short-term bias of  macroeconomic policy, which tended to generate
exchange-rate lags as a result of  the abundance of  foreign capital for much
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The export orientation of  the region’s countries and the protectionist
practices of  the developed countries have made the issue of  market access
more important. Hence, the Latin American and Caribbean governments
have been particularly active in reaching bilateral and plurilateral preferential
agreements that are both intraregional and extraregional in scope (see figure
7). The rationale for this strategy is that unilateral liberalization does not
guarantee the openness of  target markets. Thus, in an economy that is
undergoing globalization and regionalization simultaneously, countries seek
strategies for positioning themselves in import markets in ways that will
give their products greater and more reliable access to those markets.
Figure 7
Exports in the framework of preferential agreements
(As  percentages of exports)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis
of official figures from the countries.
Notes: - IPTA: Intraregional preferential trade agreements.
- EPTA: Extraregional preferential trade agreements.
- PTA: Preferential trade agreements.
In 1991 multilateral preferential agreements were practically the only
ones in force. They were associated with the region’s four imperfect customs
unions, which represented roughly 6% of  total exports. This situation
changed dramatically in the 1990s. Considering export destinations in 2003
and current preferential agreements, 61.2% of  the region’s exports may be
expected to occur within the framework of  these agreements in 2004. The
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2. Meagre and volatile economic growth
Another significant economic phenomenon of the period 1991-2003
was increased domestic and, particularly, external confidence in the
authorities responsible for macroeconomic management, as a result of
their success in reducing price instability and controlling fiscal imbalances,
two of  the region’s endemic ills. Central government fiscal deficits have
fallen significantly as a percentage of  GDP since the late 1980s. Starting in
1999, however, significant differences could be observed from one country
to another, with fiscal crises affecting a number of economies in the last
few years and high debt-to-GDP ratios still prevailing in some countries
(ILPES, 2004). The progress made in terms of  price stability has been
more uniform and has had more lasting effects. Average inflation in the
region fell steadily, reaching single-digit levels in 2003 (ECLAC, 2003).
Expectations that controlling fiscal imbalances and inflation would
lead to faster economic growth and a steady increase in investment did not
materialize, however. In fact, the macroeconomic management model that
produced such significant progress on these fronts has also been partially
responsible for the increased sensitivity of  economic growth to foreign
capital flows and for some undesirable features of  the productive
restructuring process, as well as the propensity for national banking crises
in a number of  countries (Ocampo, 2001).
Although a few Latin American and Caribbean economies started
growing again towards the end of  the 1980s, the recovery did not spread
to the region as a whole until the early 1990s, when capital inflows
rebounded after a long period of  negative external transfers. These
flows facilitated structural reform, as well as price-stabilization programmes
based on exchange-rate anchors. Meanwhile, the ability to attract foreign
capital increased as a result of  economic reforms, particularly the
liberalization of  capital-account regulations and privatizations, which
spurred large-scale foreign direct investment.
GDP growth, however, was low in comparison to the rates posted in
earlier decades, except in the lost decade of  the 1980s. In the period 1991-
2003, the annual average increase in GDP was only 2.5%, or less than half
the 5.5% recorded between 1950 and 1980 (see table 6). Moreover, the
region’s performance in the 1990s was clearly poorer than that of  other
developing regions, especially South-East Asia, which expanded at an
average rate of  6%.
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Table 6
GDP GROWTH AND VOLATILITY IN SELECTED PERIODS
(Average annual rates)
World Latin America
Average rate Standard deviation Average rate Standard deviation
1950-1980 4.6 1.49 5.5 1.70
1981-2003 2.8 1.05 2.1 2.17
1991-2003 2.5 0.87 2.5 1.93
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of
official figures from the countries.
The region’s economic growth has been not only slow, but also highly
volatile. While the standard deviation of  annual growth rates in Latin
America and the Caribbean with respect to the average rate (1.70) was very
close to the corresponding value at the world level (1.49) between 1950
and 1980, it was more than double that value between 1981 and 2003 (2.17
and 1.05, respectively). Both in the region and worldwide, growth was less
volatile between 1991 and 2003 than it had been in the previous decade.
However, the relation between the two groups’ standard deviations stayed
the same (1.93 and 0.87, respectively). While a number of  elements (trade
factors and domestic policy) had an impact on the volatility of  the region’s
growth, changes in the capital account are the single most important element
in this respect.
One lesson that emerges clearly from the region’s recent experience is
that instability in real variables is also very costly. In recessionary phases of
the business cycle, resources that may be unrecoverable are dissipated.
This is the case when firms lose tangible and intangible capital and when
the economy loses human capital as a result of  unemployment and
underemployment. Furthermore, the uncertainty associated with volatile
growth rates can be very harmful for new investment, as it triggers defensive
microeconomic strategies designed only to protect firms’ assets in a hostile
environment, as opposed to offensive strategies, which require high rates
of  investment and incorporation of  technical advances.
Meanwhile, in expansionary phases, economic agents, both public and
private, tend to underestimate the long-term effects of  their spending and
financing decisions. When a crisis breaks out, the resulting costs tend to be
very high. In addition to the loss of  assets laboriously accumulated over
the years, pressure is generated to socialize these losses, as the only alternative
to a systemic crisis. The magnitude of  the consequences of  this breaking
of  contracts depends on how widespread the phenomenon is. In any case,
it compromises present and future levels of  fiscal (or quasi-fiscal)
expenditure and hurts the financial system’s credibility. Restoring confidence
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takes time, and the financial system becomes more risk-averse, to the
detriment of  its ability to fulfil its primary economic function.
The region’s poor investment and productivity performance helps
explain its disappointing economic growth. Gross investment as a
percentage of  GDP increased slightly until 1997, then fell to a level lower
than the one posted at the beginning of  the decade. Its counterpart, saving,
was also disappointing in this period. Public saving fell and private saving
failed to rise, essentially because domestic credit was channelled into
consumption and external saving replaced domestic saving to a large extent,
as more capital flowed into the region (Uthoff  and Titelman, 1998).
In a sample consisting of 10 countries of the region, total factor
productivity rose at an average annual rate of  only 0.6% if  measured in
terms of  the simple average for these countries, or 0.2% if  measured in
terms of  the weighted average.8  The difference between the two averages
is explained by the poor performance of  the two largest economies (Brazil
and Mexico), which had negative rates. Moreover, 1997 marked a turning
point in productivity trends. Between 1990 and 1997, the simple average
of  the annual rates of  productivity growth (1.9%) was not far from the
figure for the period 1950-1980. On the other hand, the trend was decidedly
poor from 1997 to 2003, with annual rates of  -1.1% owing to the backslide
observed in all the countries, especially those whose productivity had
increased the most in 1990-1997 (Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela).
3. Increased structural disparity among the region’s economies
The fact that export growth far outpaced economic growth in 1991-
2003 is related to a stage of  structural transition marked by abrupt and
indiscriminate trade liberalization in a context of rather widespread
exchange-rate lags. Productive enterprises consequently faced profound
changes in the rules of  the game. Although new activities emerged, the
dominant phenomenon was not the creation of  a new production structure,
but rather the initial destruction of  the most fragile segment of  the existing
production base.
The keener competition that characterizes open economies has made
the business environment more uncertain. This is because liberalization
transmits to the domestic environment the factors that create insecurity in
the international environment: the effects of  technological change,
variations in relative prices at the international level, and activity levels and
8 The countries considered are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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exchange rates in export markets and in countries that produce competing
goods. Local uncertainty about macroeconomic conditions, rules of  the
game and the learning process imposed by the presence of  new domestic
and foreign competitors is also a factor. This proliferation of  uncertainty
helps to explain the current concentration of  new investment in just a few
sectors and agents. Without question, the conditions in which these changes
took place did not provide a level playing field for all the various agents of
production in the region’s economies. The process of  adaptation has been
marked by flaws in the market and, in particular, sharp information
asymmetries between different producers. These phenomena have created
significant differences in terms of  principles and practices for connecting
with foreign markets, access to financing (especially long-term) and the
technological knowledge needed to compete in the new environment. This,
in turn, gave rise to very different responses in the production system as a
whole, which have accentuated the structural heterogeneity of  the region’s
economies and, most importantly, have led to the exclusion of  many
economic agents from the transition to a more modern production sector.
Thus, beyond the poor performance of  aggregate productivity, trends
in each economic sector were different, as figure 8 indicates. Average labour
productivity in the primary sector showed strong, sustained annual growth
beginning in 1970, in both agriculture (4.1%) and mining (6.8%). Between
1991 and 1997 this increase in productivity accelerated moderately in
agriculture (4.4%) and intensively in mining (12.6%). The increase in mining
productivity is linked to the sector’s notable expansion, and both phenomena
are the direct result of  economic reform. Indeed, mining potential in a




latin america (10 countries): change in labour productivity, by sector
(Simple average for the countries)
Source:André Hofman, Crecimiento y productividad en América Latina: una visión a largo
plazo (LC/R.1947), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 1999.
For the agricultural sector, economic liberalization and market
deregulation changed the output and export baskets and affected the
adoption and the repercussions of  new technology, including increased
yield, greater activity in livestock and forestry and a general decline in
employment. In several cases, these factors accelerated changes in agriculture
that had begun one or more decades earlier. Increased agricultural
productivity reduced the disparity between sectors, since average labour
productivity is lower in agriculture than in other sectors. On the other
hand, opportunities for raising agricultural productivity varied enormously
within each country, depending on the size of  farms and producers’ access
to inputs and resources.
Labour productivity in the secondary sector (manufacturing and
construction), after a long period of  stagnation with minor fluctuations,
increased between 1990 and 1997 (by an average annual rate of  2.6% in
manufacturing and 4.4% in construction) and then fell between 1998 and
2002 (-1.9% and -2.8% per year, respectively). Thus, increases and decreases
have been more marked in construction than in manufacturing. The
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another and, above all, between production units of  different sizes. There
are major differences in productivity between large firms, on the one hand,
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), on the other (as the latter
firms, on average, have less than half  the productivity levels of  large firms),
and also between SMEs and informal-sector microenterprises (whose
productivity is not even a third of  the levels seen in large firms, and went
down in the course of  the 1990s).
Lastly, labour productivity in the tertiary sector fell steadily in the
1980s (-2.6% annually), then recovered between 1990 and 2002 (2.7%
annually). This is the result of  two contradictory trends. On the one hand,
there was a great deal of  restructuring, both in public services and in the
financial sector, as privatization and foreign investment boomed. This
restructuring was associated with processes of  expansion and personnel
cuts in privatized firms. On the other hand, business services expanded
considerably as a consequence of  outsourcing (ECLAC, 2004). The increase
in labour productivity after 1990 is largely attributable to these factors.
Meanwhile, the productivity of  other services continued to follow the
downward trend that had begun in 1980. Seven out of  every ten jobs created
in the 1990s were in the urban informal sector (ILO, 2000).
Trends in small businesses, both urban and rural, vary widely. In a
number of  countries and sectors, many such firms have disappeared or
moved into the informal sector. While many of  these changes occurred in
the 1980s as a result of  a pronounced slump in per capita income, the
process was not reversed in the 1990s. On the contrary, renewed growth
was insufficient to prevent an increase in informal employment, which
grew from somewhat over 30% of  total employment in 1980 to 43% in
1990 and 48.4% by the end of  the 1990s. Perhaps one of  the most distinctive
features of  recent years has been the increase in informal employment in
urban areas, where its share of  total employment rose by five percentage
points, representing 20 million individuals (ECLAC, 2001).
III. Productive development in open economies
Economic development follows a general logic that consists of
accumulating resources, mobilizing them productively and using them ever
more effectively. The ways in which this can be done, however, vary widely.
Both old and new studies on growth theory have put forward a range of
possible analytical approaches that is far from being exhausted by existing
models. Concrete analysis, however, is not concerned with multiplying the
number of  possible approaches, but with identifying one or more that are
demonstrably plausible and relevant. Proposals based on arguments that
are presumed to be universally valid are thus of  little use. Almost by
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definition, economic development is a non-repeating process that occurs
at a specific time and place and creates irreversible changes in the
configuration of  activities and the behaviour of  agents (Furtado, 1956).
The raw material of  development analysis consists of  episodes that are in
some sense unique; that is, episodes that share elements of  the general
logic cited above, but cannot be used as a basis for mechanical extrapolations.
One long-standing and useful distinction is the one between an
economy’s development and the mere expansion of  its scale. The hallmark
of  economic development is structural change –i.e., a change in the sectoral
composition of  production– that results in greater diversification of
economic activities (with more division of  labour), of  the economy itself
and, probably, of  its relations with the rest of  the world. Accordingly, it is
to be expected that the production apparatus and individual skills will
become more complex as behaviour, institutions and modes of  social
interaction change. Although development entails changes in the
configuration of  the economy, the ability to continually generate new
activities that are dynamic and innovative, in a broad sense, is an essential
determinant of  rapid economic growth (Ocampo, 2002).9
These changes can hardly be expected to conform strictly to a pre-set
course. The success of  an economy is more likely to depend on how agents
identify and take advantage of  opportunities and deal with the constraints
imposed by the immediate and global economic environments. Opportunity
is a dynamic phenomenon, and the economic system must adapt to changing
circumstances. While it is important for countries to have a development
strategy so that economic agents can take it into account when allocating
resources and taking other decisions, productive development is most
probably the outcome of  a series of  responses to problems that emerge
over time.
In any case, it is essential to have a common vision that is based on
collective thinking about specific issues and therefore transcends mere
doctrinaire definitions and the disagreements that customarily accompany
them. For the vision to have political legitimacy, the different social groups
must recognize that the chosen course can benefit their interests and must
trust that the issue of  distributive balance will be addressed. As Prebisch
(1963) stated, the proof  of  a development process’s dynamic validity is its
9 Schumpeter’s (1961) definition of types of innovation, or “new combinations”, as he called
them, includes the introduction of new goods and services or major changes in quality;
the development of new production or marketing processes; the opening of new markets;
the discovery of new sources of natural resources or new ways of exploiting known
resources; and the establishment of new structures in production sectors.
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ability to speed up growth and to progressively improve income distribution.
From this point of  view, it is clear that economic development goes far
beyond purely economic or narrowly technical issues (Sen, 1999).
Since development is generated through the introduction of  new
activities and forms of  production, it is unlikely to progress continuously,
with the different strata of  the economy advancing in parallel. Alternation
between upswings and downswings, as well as tension and ruptures in the
system, are unavoidable features of  the process. The outcome depends on
how these vicissitudes are dealt with, and, ultimately, on the solidity of  the
coalition for development.
It is useful to regard innovation as a process that generates productivity
gains through localized learning and that has knock-on effects that operate
through complementarities and linkages (Bardhan, 1998). The existence
of  these effects, which has been reasonably well documented in a number
of  cases, shows that growth generates externalities, whose intensity depends
on the economy’s configuration. Growth has a systemic component that
arises from the interaction between the expansion of  the activity in question
and productivity gains in other activities, and also from the provision of
more and better collective services, such as traditional public goods,
infrastructure and social services (health, education, etc.).
Sustained growth is hard to achieve without the use of  localized stimuli,
which entail, at least initially, more uneven economic growth. At the same
time, development requires that increased productivity and income spread
to the rest of  the economy in one way or another. This means that, beyond
the lags and delays that are to be expected, the stimuli must be spread and
propagated. The need to facilitate progress in those segments of  the
economy that have growth potential, while ensuring a certain homogeneity
so that progress in these segments can spread and produce systemic effects,
may give rise to dilemmas that are difficult to solve in the abstract, without
examining specific problems and conditions in the economy (ECLAC,
1990).10  Thus, a structural perspective that is concrete and non-dogmatic
seems to be the best approach.
10 A dilemma arises, for instance, when it is advantageous for a given activity with growth
potential to have access to high-quality, low-cost inputs that could be imported, and yet,
at the same time, it is felt that the activity’s backward linkages could be an important
means of transmitting growth to the rest of the economy.
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2. Principal components of  productive development
Development is associated with changes in the social system as a whole,
as indicated by the simple observation of  economies that have made the
transition. Although phenomena must be somehow isolated before they
can be studied with any degree of  precision, it is a mistake to assume that
certain elements of  the system, such as institutions, for example, remain
constant. All this suggests that the analysis of  development is necessarily
an intricate conceptual construct.
As a general analytical approach, the potential growth curve of  an
economy’s output can be represented by an expanded production function
whose arguments include the accumulation of  physical capital (natural and
constructed), human capital, the knowledge capital embedded in technology
and business practices, and institutional capital. Trends in these growth
factors, in turn, will be influenced by current and expected future resource
levels. This perspective is useful because it focuses on the interaction
between these factors, their complementarities and their substitution
possibilities as general determinants of  growth. The marginal effect of
each factor, and hence the forms of  resource accumulation that seem most
urgent or promising, vary according to the state of  the economy, the actual
availability of  resources and conditions beyond the country’s borders. It is
not enough to say that development requires increases in all the factors of
production. At any given time, dilemmas will arise as a result of  budgetary
constraints, which affect public policy.
Furthermore, these factors, like the very indicator used to measure
development levels quantitatively, such as GDP, are not simple variables.
On the contrary, they reflect aggregates of  very diverse components. When
these black boxes are opened up –to echo Fajnzylber’s (1990) manner of
referring to technology– the analysis becomes more complex, but only
then does it begin to deal with concrete things; i.e., with matters on which
specific decisions are taken. Hence, it is unlikely that investment in
technology or education will have the same meaning in a large, diversified
economy as it does in a small, low-income economy concentrated in the
primary sector.
The frame of  reference for this analysis consists of  the lessons
incorporated into economic theory and good practices. These, as heuristic
indications, have been inferred from previous cases, while respecting the
principle of  the “originality of  the copy” (Cardoso, 1977). In looking at
the specific problems encountered in a given economy’s development, it is
necessary to make a considerable analytical effort to consider the
idiosyncratic features of  the case. At the same time, it is possible to impart
a certain perspective to issues that have been the subject of  intense debate.
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(a) The macroeconomy, investment and sustainable development
At the outset, it should be stressed that no clear distinction can be
made between long-term growth trends and short-term fluctuations
(Heymann, 2000). On the one hand, the evidence suggests that
macroeconomic volatility affects growth. The willingness to invest certainly
depends on the maintenance of  predictable macroeconomic conditions
and on a level of  activity that makes ample use of  the available factors of
production. Thus, decisions regarding the expansion of  supply capacity
are influenced by the level and variability of  demand (Kaldor, 1978; Barro,
1991). On the other hand, changes in public and private agents’ perceptions
of  growth trends may have macroeconomic consequences of  the first order.
Budget constraints mean that agents’ spending capacity depends on the
generation of  present and future income. Accordingly, economic growth
and productivity gains are essential elements of  macroeconomic
sustainability.
Considering that the region’s recent history was characterized by low
growth combined with high volatility, it is essential to implement
macroeconomic policies that not only control inflation but also help to
smooth out business cycles. These policies should be based on a broader
definition of  macroeconomic stability that also includes real targets for
variables such as the pace and stability of  economic growth (Ffrench-Davis,
2004). During the growth phase of  the business cycle, macroeconomic
policies should be geared towards preventing excessive increases in
borrowing by public and private stakeholders, significant imbalances in
key relative prices and price bubbles in domestic assets that will require
overadjustments when the cycle enters a downswing. Fiscal policy should
include fiscal deficit and public spending criteria based on structural
variables such as potential GDP, and should provide for the creation of
public revenue stabilization funds pertaining to income from taxes, raw
materials exports and windfall profits from the sale of  public assets.
Monetary policies should be aimed at preventing cyclical upturns in external
financing from triggering excessively rapid increases in external and
domestic credit to the private sector and at keeping interest rates compatible
with internal and external balances. Exchange-rate policy is now subject to
demands that are contradictory and hard to reconcile, since the exchange
rate reflects the logic of  both trade and finance. Accordingly, managed
floats, which fall between the exchange-rate regimes at either end of  the
spectrum, are the most attractive policy alternative for preventing the real
exchange rate from straying too far from long-term equilibrium and for
combining flexibility with stability. Thus, the difficulties inherent in monetary
management are heightened in open economies, although it is possible to
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enhance the effectiveness of  such management and the degree of  freedom
to manage the interest rate by incorporating certain elements into monetary
policy. These include controls on capital inflows, increased liquidity
requirements during upswings in the business cycle, an active approach to
the prudential regulation and supervision of  financial systems (incorporating
countercyclical considerations into the determination of  provisioning
requirements for loan portfolios) and an explicit “liability policy” aimed at
improving the maturity profile of  public and private debt, both domestic
and external (ECLAC, 2002).
 In the region, the financial system has tended to amplify the
macroeconomic effects of  economic shocks and, accordingly, to increase
the frequency and sharpness of  the business cycle. As mentioned above,
mitigating these effects through appropriate policies, proper countercyclical
regulation and financial deepening is essential for the developing economies.
It is also necessary to develop a local-currency financial market to avoid
the instability associated with the dollarization of financial assets and
liabilities. Dollarization is related to the level and volatility of  inflation and
to economic stakeholders’ expectations as to future inflation trends.
Considering the region’s history, the consolidation of  a local-currency
financial market will require a long period of  stability. During the transition,
countries should seek to develop mechanisms for medium- and long-term
saving in local currency. A key instrument for achieving this is an inflation-
indexed unit of  account. In view of  the risks entailed by the use of  foreign
currency in financial transactions, it is important to impose higher reserve
requirements for foreign-exchange deposits and higher provisioning
requirements for foreign-exchange loans to the non-tradables sector.
Moreover, international institutions could accelerate the creation of  local-
currency financial markets by providing guarantees to support the issuance
of  debt in those currencies (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003).
Since the financial sector plays a key role in enabling agents of
production to reconcile their intertemporal income and expenditure needs,
it is essential to reduce intermediation costs by developing financial
instruments for hedging risk. This will make it possible to meet the needs
of  a diverse production system and to finance long-term investment
projects. Such initiatives are particularly important for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), which have always had trouble obtaining financing
at rates compatible with the profitability of  their investments. Because the
banking sector plays such an important role in the region’s financial systems,
any strategy for channelling more resources to the production sector must
include measures to strengthen private and public banks’ financial
intermediation capacity, while not neglecting the development of  capital
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markets. Guarantee funds, credit scoring systems, factoring, leasing and
leaseback arrangements are some of  the instruments that have been
developed in countries of  the region and that should be promoted. In
addition, public development banks, with new operating and corporate
governance modalities that correct the mistakes of  the past, should
contribute to the development of  production either by providing financing
to stakeholders that have heretofore been excluded or by acting as a catalyst
and developer of  new forms of  financial intermediation.
The correlation between macroeconomic stability and growth hinges
on the dynamics of  saving and investment. In cases of  successful
development there have been significant increases in the physical capital
stock and in productivity, made possible by a rise in the investment ratio.
The physical capital stock is also a complex variable, however. In recent
debates on this subject, it has been suggested that there is a profound
complementarity, in terms of  the real economy, between productive
investment by private enterprise and a country’s infrastructure stock. Owing
to the strong influence of  infrastructure on business productivity and on
the economy’s systemic competitiveness, and ultimately on growth,
governments have sought to ensure that adequate infrastructure is available.
In order to grow at a rate of  3% annually between 2000 and 2010, Latin
America will have to invest about 3% of  GDP in infrastructure each year,
or US$ 70 billion. This figure reflects new investment of  US$ 57 billion
(about 2.2% of  GDP) and investment in replacement and maintenance of
US$ 13 billion. New investment needs are not the same in all sectors. As
table 7 shows, for the period 2000-2010, the estimates of  investment needs
are highest for the electric power and roads sectors (Fay, 2001; Fay and
Yepes, 2003).
Table 7
ESTIMATES OF NEW INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1995-2010
(Percentages of GDP)
1995-2000 2000-2010
Fixed telecommunications 0.22 0.27
Electricity 0.76 0.99





Source:Marianne Fay, Financing the Future: Infrastructure Needs in Latin America, 2000-
2005, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2001; Marianne Fay and Tito Yepes, “Investing
in infrastructure: what is needed from 2000 to 2010”, World Bank Policy Research
Paper, No. 3102, 2003.
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In the current circumstances, this level of  investment can only be
reached through combined public and private efforts. However, the future
of  private investment in infrastructure in the region is uncertain at best. In
addition to the risks perceived by private firms and the difficulties stemming
from frequent processes of  contract renegotiation, there is growing
dissatisfaction among users with the quality and cost of  public services
that have been privatized or franchised to the private sector. According to
recent surveys, in Argentina the percentage of  satisfied users of  privatized
and franchised services fell from 50% in 1998 to slightly over 10% in 2002.
In Mexico, the percentage decreased from 60% to 25% and in Brazil, from
55% to 35%. In Chile and Bolivia, user satisfaction dropped by almost 20
points, from 60% in 1998 to 40% in 2000 (Foster, 2004).
The foregoing underscores the need to improve and strengthen the
regulatory mechanisms of  the public sector in relation to the various
modalities of  public-private partnership. The need for active government
regulation depends on the degree of  competition in the infrastructure
sectors in which the private sector becomes involved. Where opportunities
and incentives for competition are absent, greater regulation is required
(Cavalcanti and Santos de Franca, 2003). There is thus a need to improve
regulation so that private investment in infrastructure will transmit
productivity gains to families and production sectors. Only then will it
become a significant engine of  productive development.
In several countries of  the region there has been an obvious dearth of
public investment in infrastructure over the past decade. Such investment
is essential for improving the economy’s competitiveness and, in particular,
for incorporating certain sectors and geographical areas into the productive
development process. Increasing the infrastructure stock involves not only
improving its quality, but also increasing the availability of  adequate
resources. Accordingly, in a context of  fiscal discipline, the applicable
regulations should provide that certain infrastructure outlays should not
be treated as deficits in the programmes agreed upon with international
lending institutions. These programmes serve as an essential source of
financing, either directly or by affording access to private credit markets. A
proposal in this regard was presented by Mexico, on behalf  of  a group of
countries of  the region, at the Evian Summit held in 2003, and by the
Presidents of  Brazil and Argentina to the International Monetary Fund.
These initiatives seek to bring about greater flexibility in the management
of  fiscal accounts by refining fiscal and budgetary control instruments so
that capital expenditures are treated differently from current expenditures
and investments are thus accounted for in a way that does not inhibit rational
economic decision-making. This same line of  thought is evident in the
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Carta de Lima, a joint declaration signed by the representatives of  the
governments of  the South American countries at the most recent annual
meeting of  the Inter-American Development Bank.
One way of  introducing greater flexibility and promoting a growth-
oriented fiscal policy is to recognize that investment and current expenditure
are different economic phenomena and that, as such, they should be treated
differently, in particular by avoiding the imposition of  limits or cutbacks
on public investment in the case of  projects whose rates of  return will
exceed the investment costs.11  The conventional rule of  fiscal control, which
imposes deficit goals in relation to total spending, does not take account
of  the assets generated by public investment, but only of  the cost of
acquiring them, thus creating an anti-investment bias. Fiscal control should
revolve around the concept of  intertemporal solvency rather than deficit,
as the former concept is more important for fiscal sustainability. It
incorporates the notion that public investment generates financial returns
that will enable governments to fulfil their obligations in the medium and
long terms.
A second means of  introducing greater fiscal flexibility is by
strengthening mechanisms that will stimulate various forms of  public-
private partnership, which, among the possible forms of  collaboration,
have become an important alternative. These partnerships enable
governments to create new infrastructure without immediately adding
capital outlays to the budget, since the investments are financed by the
private sector, which is remunerated by the government through charges,
fees, rents or another form of  current expenditure once service delivery is
operational. This mechanism not only makes it possible to utilize private
capital and administration, but also helps to spread investment costs over
time, as the investment is amortized with the outlays that the government
pays periodically to the operators of  the service.12
11 Similar arguments have been put forward by various countries of the European Union.
Faced with the need to increase investment in infrastructure, those countries have
suggested that some flexibility should be allowed in the rules of the Union’s Stability and
Growth Pact so that infrastructure investments are exempted from the targets and ceilings
imposed by those rules (International Monetary Fund, 2004).
12 Public-private partnerships enable the private sector to supply infrastructure and services
in areas traditionally deemed to be the province of government, such as hospitals, schools,
jails, roads, water and sanitation. Under this arrangement, the government establishes
what service is to be provided by the private sector, which then designs, builds, finances
and operates the service.
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At present, numerous countries of  the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) have adopted arrangements of
this type. Possibly the best public-private partnership programme developed
to date is the Private Finance Initiative, created by the United Kingdom in
1992, which accounts for 14% of  public investment in the country and is
applied in key areas of  infrastructure services. Other countries where public-
private partnerships contribute significantly to investment are Australia
and Ireland.
A third way of  increasing fiscal flexibility in the management of  public
investments has to do with the role played by multilateral development
banks. Today, the capacity of  these institutions to disburse approved loans
is being diminished by the budgetary practices of  the public sector. This
type of  financing is recorded as an expenditure, and is therefore subject to
the quotas and ceilings imposed by public expenditure containment policies,
which delay the execution of  loans and thus hinder the progress of  works.
For this reason, IDB, for example, disbursed only 60% of  its approved
budget for investment projects in 2000; in 2003 the percentage fell to 30%.
The projects financed by multilateral development banks are generally high-
quality projects that ensure the microeconomic consistency and
transparency of  the investments. It is therefore reasonable to expect that
they will yield positive social returns. Accordingly, as with public-private
partnerships, the expenditure that these projects generate should be
accounted for in national budgets at the time when governments make
payments on the loans, not when they receive the loans. This would make
it possible to spread the financial burden over time, thereby exerting less
pressure on fiscal goals and opening up greater fiscal leeway for obtaining
financing from multilateral development banks.
In short, it is necessary to use a variety of  mechanisms to give the
region’s governments more flexibility to invest in infrastructure, without,
of  course, neglecting the need to keep the public debt at levels compatible
with the country’s medium-term fiscal capacity.
Lastly, the expansion and sustainability of  the economy’s production
capacity requires not only the conservation and expansion of  the capital
stock, but also the exploitation, valuation and conservation of  natural
resources. Indeed, the poor saving performance of  the region’s countries
looks even worse when losses in terms of  natural capital are taken into
account.
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Figure 9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ADJUSTED SAVING, 2001
Source:Based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003, Washington, D.C.
Thus, sustained growth requires a framework of  policies and
institutions to protect the production base that relies on natural resources.
The complementarity between economic growth, increased productivity
and preservation of  the integrity and environmental sustainability of  natural
capital is linked to the capacity of  public policy to correct market flaws
caused by the absence of  effective pricing and ownership regimes, coupled
with the existence of  incomplete markets for numerous natural resources
and environmental services.
Based on the evidence accumulated in recent years, the environmental
agenda should focus on three lines of  action that will allow better linkage
between productive development policies and the sustainable management
of  natural resources and the environment. The first consists of
strengthening the capacity of the Latin American and Caribbean countries
to play an active role in various international negotiations. At present there
are two issues of  vital importance on the agenda of  international
agreements. One is the debate on intellectual property rights, which tends
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of  a significant proportion of  biodiversity, while the developed countries
have a high level of  technological development and in many cases hold
industrial patents. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) implies a
“privatization” of  the rights to these resources, a matter which the countries
of the region need to examine carefully in order to identify strategies for
negotiation. The other major issue concerns the proposal of  the developing
world to work towards the elimination (or reduction) of  tariffs and non-
tariff  barriers to environmental goods and services. This is also a source
of  controversy, although the WTO member countries have agreed to carry
it out, in accordance with the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
The second line of  action consists of  developing an institutional
platform for explicitly integrating the objectives and instruments of
environmental policy into economic and sectoral policies. This is particularly
important in relation to technological innovations designed to improve the
sustainable management of  forest, energy, mining, fishing and agricultural
resources.
The use of  renewable energies is another element that should figure
prominently on the public agenda. The development of  these types of
energy could benefit from the gradual emergence of  an international market
for projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The region has the
opportunity to participate in this market by opting for more efficient and,
preferably, alternative sources of  energy (wind, solar or hydraulic energy)
and by maintaining and strengthening ecosystems with high carbon
absorption capacity.
The third line of  action consists of  recouping the cost of  negative
environmental externalities arising from the activities of  various production
sectors. Tax rebates, subsidies and tax exemptions aimed at attracting
investments and projects in natural resource sectors and activities with
known environmental impact have had a negative effect on the environment
and run counter to efforts to develop instruments for quantifying and
internalizing the social costs of  environmental degradation. Fiscal
instruments for dealing with the environmental externalities of  production
processes may be guided by one of  two basic premises: the polluter pays
principle or the consumer pays principle, meaning that the cost is assumed
by either investors or consumers.
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(b) Structure and productive development
The idea that development is associated with an ongoing process of
increasing productivity says nothing, in principle, about an economy’s
international linkages. However, the most productive economies show an
ability to increase exports and, in particular, exports entailing a higher degree
of  processing and technological content. Though international economic
relations are asymmetrical, it is difficult for economies such as those of
Latin America and the Caribbean to aspire to development without close
and growing interaction with the world economy. Economic growth involves
a deepening of  the division of  labour and ongoing improvements in
production techniques and processes. This requires a diversified set of
inputs, many of  which are complex. Some are physical, but others include
knowledge and abilities that are not incorporated into objects and that
may even be tacit.13 Obtaining them requires broad and fluid access to the
rest of  the world’s production.
The diversification of  demand may be expected to be accompanied
by an increase in import coefficients in relation to GDP. Hence, exports
may be expected to increase more rapidly than GDP. An expansion of
exports involves various elements. Quantitatively, it involves generating
resources to maintain the demand for imports relative to a given level of
aggregate spending. This requirement is linked with the need to work within
the bounds of  intertemporal budgetary constraints, that is, being able to
finance accumulation without excessive borrowing, which can lead to the
need for recessionary adjustments. Thus, it is not the composition of
exports, but rather their total value that is important in this respect.
However, exports also have a qualitative dimension, insofar as the
quality of  exports contributes to an improvement in production capacity.
Thus, the economy’s participation in international markets for relatively
complex goods, along with the consequent need to meet quality standards
and requirements in terms of  the stability of  supply, can translate into a
learning process.
Taking advantage of  the opportunities that –despite the presence of
asymmetries– exist in international trade, without creating types of
segmentation in the economic system that would be difficult to reverse
later on, poses significant problems. These problems cannot be tackled,
however, by rejecting integration with the larger world or by opening up
13 That is, the combination between Romer’s “idea gap” and “object gap” (Romer, 1994),
which distinguishes between the externalities inherent in physical investment and the
accumulation of material inputs.
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the economy indiscriminately. The basic objective must be to improve the
quality of  the country’s international position by diversifying its exports in
terms of  destination markets and products and by incorporating greater
value added and knowledge. The following measures may be useful in this
regard:
(i) Eliminating the anti-export bias in the prices of  inputs and services,
either through drawbacks of  indirect taxes or through temporary
clearance regimes;
(ii) Supporting pioneering export firms by providing incentives for exports
of  new products or for penetrating new markets that help defray the
high initial costs of  these activities and that compensate firms for the
positive externalities they generate for other firms that imitate them.;14
(iii) Establishing an active form of  commercial diplomacy aimed at lifting
existing barriers to the region’s products, particularly in developed
countries. This strategy must take into account the negative impact
that tariff  escalation in the developed world has in terms of  the need
for greater value added;
(iv) Providing institutional support for export activity in such areas as
information, export financing and insurance, management training
and the promotion of  exportable supply abroad;
(v) Disseminating information on the requirements of  export markets in
terms of  quality, environmental regulations, standardization, time
frames and volumes;
(vi) Providing access to export financing and insurance, particularly for
SMEs;
(vii) Vesting responsibility for export promotion policy in a single institution
with stable financing and qualified professional staff, or coordinating
initiatives in the different areas involved.
In general, the design of  incentives should take into account the fact
that their primary aim is to promote new export products or new export
markets; that the support they provide must be moderate so that it will
attract firms that are really willing to share the cost of  the programme; that
the assistance must be temporary so as to avoid the use of  permanent
subsidies; that the programme’s results should be subject to periodic external
14 The simplified drawback applied in Chile could be an appropriate instrument, although
its implementation is now subject to the restrictions imposed by the World Trade
Organization since the Uruguay Round. Another instrument for supporting these activities
could be the facilitation of access to credit at international rates, which is not considered
a subsidy under the WTO rules, but is a valuable incentive for the firms in the region,
bearing in mind the difficulties faced by their capital markets.
PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN OPEN ECONOMIES
48
evaluations so that it can be modified or suspended if  it does not help to
increase and diversify exports; and that the programme must be designed
and administered jointly by public and private agencies. Lastly, it is essential
that export promotion policies be approached as medium- and long-term
strategies so that their continuity will be assured, regardless of  changes in
the government teams that implement them.
The countries of  the region recognize that local incentives are not
sufficient unless access to larger international markets is achieved. In view
of  the lacklustre results attained at the multilateral level, regional and bilateral
agreements are seen as an alternative means of  obtaining market access,
since they tend to reduce discriminatory practices on the part of  developed
countries. As a matter of  fact, the number of  agreements registered with
WTO has more than doubled in recent years In addition to North-South
agreements, developing countries have undertaken negotiations designed
to step up South-South trade. While these agreements may be advantageous
in the short run, their rules of  origin are beginning to generate high
administrative costs. The region will undoubtedly benefit from advances
in multilateral negotiations on agricultural products and from increased
access to developed-country markets. It should be stressed that it is not
the exports’ degree of  processing that determines their impact on growth,
but rather their effect on the accumulation of  resources and capacities
within the economic system. Thus, expansion depends on the existence of
productive and technological linkages, as well as on the development of
entrepreneurial capacity and ties among firms (partnerships, public-private
synergies at the local level, production clusters and value chains).
In a developing economy, the export mix will probably shift towards
more complex and processed products. This shift is usually gradual and is
essentially a sign of  development rather than a force driving development.
Thus, part of  the learning process that is an inherent component of
development encompasses the ability to produce goods on a competitive
basis that were previously purchased abroad. Since this can take the form
of  a learning-by-doing process based on practical experience, public policy
mechanisms for fostering infant industries and for encouraging the
prospective identification, transfer, adaptation, and creation and diffusion
of  technology are relevant in specific situations, provided that problems
arising with regard to such incentives are handled properly.15
15 As pointed out by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002), there are two types of learning
that are relevant to economic growth, namely the adaptation of existing technologies
and innovation in creating new ones. Ramos (2000) analyses the importance of this
distinction for the countries in the region.
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This form of  import substitution seems to be an inherent part of  the
growth process and requires sustained saving and investment. Opportunities
in this connection may be generated by domestic demand, supported by
public policies that bolster private accumulation by promoting the
development of  national innovation systems.
To improve the Latin American and Caribbean economies’ linkages
with the global economy in both quantitative and qualitative terms,
simultaneous and coordinated efforts in a number of  policy areas, above
and beyond trade policy per se, are therefore needed within the framework
of  a systemic approach. If  countries rely exclusively on trade policies and
neglect both their productive development and macroeconomic
environment, they may, at best, boost their exports, but without invigorating
the rest of  the economy. On the other hand, limiting export promotion to
trade reforms and the preservation of  macroeconomic equilibrium may
lead to stability but not growth, and still less to the generation of  endogenous
processes of  increasing productivity and competitiveness.
In other words, the sectoral composition of  a country’s exports reflects
its resource endowment, average productivity and stage of  technological
development. The structure of  comparative advantages and the removal
of  imperfections and distortions in the domestic market define what
products a country can export in the immediate future, while its policies
on technology, investment and education determine what it will be able to
export in the medium and long terms.
Moreover, when countries fail to invest in technology training, human
resources development and infrastructure, their policies for the promotion
and development of  exports will probably not be viable, since the high
systemic costs of  producing each unit of  the good or service to be exported
will have to be defrayed. In the long run, there is a real risk that these
exports will not be sustainable once subsidies are reduced or eliminated.
Although there is no universally valid paradigm that indicates what
paths lead to improved international competitiveness and increased presence
in foreign markets, general guidelines can be set out with respect to the
elements that may contribute to the design of  an effective strategy for
enhancing the region’s integration with the international economy.
National strategies for technological development should take into
account each country’s existing technological capacities, its national
innovation system and its available resources, since these factors limit the
complexity and scope of  the science and technology programmes that
may be undertaken. Thus, no single technological development strategy
can be designed to suit the need for innovation of  all the countries in the
region.
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In any event, the countries of  the region are faced with the challenge
of  moving towards a conception of  technology policy which is more
pragmatic than those applied in the past, which incorporates the interaction
between supply and demand in the innovation process and makes use, in
support of  these objectives, of  more effective instruments for each case
and the coordination of  different instruments according to the level of
development of  technological capacity.
In general terms, what is envisaged is an array of  horizontal policies –to
which in principle any firm can have access– which are designed to spread
public goods and remedy static market failures, such as those affecting training,
R&D incentives, and technological services for enterprises.
As far as possible, the new horizontal policies should be proactive and
should be designed to attain a critical mass of resources for their
beneficiaries, in order not to scatter the scarce available resources over a
large number of  small projects, with the aim of  achieving effective results
more quickly. The combination of  these two conditions calls for some
degree of  targeting, which should be in keeping with the national
technological development strategy.
Nevertheless, it may be necessary to include some selective policies in
keeping with the conception of  technology policy or the projection of
existing technological capabilities. This would be so, for example, in the
case of  the need to enhance the international standing of  some enterprises
in the network by improving supplier-client relations or, more generally, to
turn the generation and circulation of  knowledge into dynamic competitive
advantages within the network.
Likewise, in some sectors where there are already specific regulations
or instruments and in some knowledge-intensive activities, horizontal
policies should be supplemented with selective or targeted sectoral
innovation policies. Similarly, in some regions where there is potential for
innovation or the development of  clusters, regional innovation policies
need to be formulated which combine horizontal (and possible sectoral)
policies within a particular territorial area.
The combination and coordination of  horizontal, vertical and selective
policies and measures to improve their position in global production
networks is a typical practice of  the most successful economies (European
Commission, 2002 and 2003).
Policy execution requires a model adapted to the institutional capacity
and level of  production complexity of  each country. As countries improve
their institutional capacity and develop more complex structures of
production they can extend the scope of  their policies and develop vertical
and selective policies in conjunction with horizontal ones.
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The deployment of  an innovation promotion strategy in the various
dimensions in question calls for considerable coordination both in the design
of  the strategy and in policy formulation and execution. Strengthening the
national innovation system demands careful coordination of  actions and
interventions as diverse as those aimed at promoting interactions between
enterprises, their suppliers and clients, universities, public and private
scientific and technological institutes and financial institutions.
These interactions must be promoted at all levels, but it is at the local
level and in the development of  clusters that they have the greatest possibilities
of  generating positive synergies through these coordinated actions.
On the other hand, not all the components of  the national innovation
system respond favourably to direct intervention. It is therefore crucial for
the State and the public sector to show their leadership qualities in carrying
through the innovation strategy. Furthermore, the State can produce a public
good with considerable impact in terms of  the directions and magnitude
of  innovations and the creation of  technological capabilities: productive
and technological scenarios which serve as a means to coordinate the
innovation processes of  enterprises and whose interactive discussion leads
to the identification of  attainable complementarities, as well as serving as a
frame of  reference for the design of  public policies to promote innovation.
In defining the areas to be promoted and in designing instruments, it
should be borne in mind that economic liberalization and increasing
competition for scarce fiscal funding, aggravated by the need to address
urgent social issues, have reduced the potential for implementing sectoral
policies of  the type that were characteristic of  ISI, not only because they
involved intensive use of  public funds, but especially because it became
increasingly difficult to use import tariffs on a widespread basis.
In view of this situation, it becomes essential to establish clear priorities
for the areas to be addressed and the instruments to be used when designing
a productive development strategy. Horizontal lines of  action (strengthening
of  clusters, promotion of  SMEs, improved international participation, and
others) can and must be complemented by more selective policies.
In this regard, there is a clear regional trend in terms of  initiatives to
encourage the integration of  productive chains, increase local value-added
content and incorporate knowledge into activities with proven capacity to
compete successfully on international markets. Policy-target sectors vary
according to the countries considered, forming a wide spectrum ranging
from primary products (crops and livestock, forestry, aquaculture and
mining) to services (such as tourism), also including manufactures –generally
natural-resource-intensive or linked to maquila export activity, but also a
number of  sectors that export goods of  high technological content.
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This is a practice that needs to be deepened, strengthening productive
linkages (both upstream and downstream) in order to increase locally-
sourced value-added and diversify the productive structure, creating new
sectors, as shown by the successful experiences of  a number of  countries
that have generated a complex and sophisticated productive structure based
on a relatively abundant endowment of  natural resources.16
Emphasis on these sectors, however, does not rule out the possibility
of  selectively promoting initiatives aimed at creating new sectors that are
not necessarily closely associated with the region’s comparative advantages,
at least from the static point of  view. The aim of  generating dynamic
comparative advantages based on new productive activities should form
part of  any comprehensive productive development strategy.
It is impossible to define a single policy agenda for the region, as this
will depend on the constraints imposed by the size of  national markets
and accumulated capacities in each country. Institutional capacity can also
be a major constraint, especially in the short run; this does not mean it is
impossible to implement productive development policies, rather that their
scope should be in accordance with those capacities. In other words, the
alternative is to reduce the scale of  activities rather than to attempt to
exceed one’s limit. In any event, improving the institutional capacity of  the
State is a prerequisite both for implementing policies to strengthen
productive structures aimed at speeding up growth in the region’s
economies, and for implementing social policies aimed at achieving a fairer
distribution of  the benefits of  that growth.
In addition, in a setting where competition for available fiscal resources
is increasingly fierce, it is essential to work on issues relating to the legitimacy
of  productive development policies.17  Implementation capacity needs to
be improved, to narrow the gap between policy design and institutional
capacity for effective implementation, the persistence of  which undermines
policy credibility. The strengthening of  public-private dialogue and the
establishment of  participation channels for bodies that represent productive
sectors will contribute towards this objective. Progress also needs to be
made in evaluating the impact of  initiatives implemented in terms of  their
ultimate objectives: economic growth, technological progress, increased
16 A case in point is Finland, which has used its forestry wealth to generate productive
linkages that enabled it, over time and at different stages, to become highly competitive
in the production of furniture, chemicals and capital goods, and even to enter the cellular
telephony market. See Ramos (1998) and World Bank (2002).




productivity, among others. Some progress has been made on this issue,
but much remains to be done.18
In short, the challenge of  productive development is to find the
combination of  policy instruments, action and opportunity for public
intervention that is best adapted to the specific development problems an
economy faces, and to its capacities and available resources. One can only
work with what one has, recognizing that problems, opportunities and
constraints will change as the process unfolds. The important point is not
to decide whether to intervene much or little, but to ensure that whatever
interventions are undertaken address specific constraints on expansion.
Thus, policy action is justified, in a particular case, when concrete benefits
can be anticipated, and when the intervention is compatible with the
resources available and with maintaining the appropriate incentives. Within
this framework, it is possible to identify examples of  densification of  the
productive, technological and business apparatus whereby production
activities that are more complex and have a higher content of  innovations
can be tackled with a view to generating dynamic comparative advantages.
(c) Labour market, social protection and education: towards a covenant for social
cohesion
Third, the liberalization process has brought new social risks, because
of  the relation between competitiveness and jobs. Job stability is no longer
a dominant feature of  how work is organized, and wage uncertainty has
increased (Rodrik, 2001). “Lifetime employment” has been replaced by
frequent changes of  job and company, accompanied by changing skill
requirements.
This global trend was heightened in the region by the low and unstable
growth rate, rapid economic liberalization and the wave of  privatizations
of  public enterprises. In the absence of  comprehensive social protection
mechanisms, labour supply moved countercyclically in line with families’
need to overcome income insecurity via the employment of  their working-
age members. This accentuated the trend for women to enter the labour
market. Production processes favoured mechanization because exposure
to competition in a context of  increasing market opening and currency
appreciations raised the cost of labour compared with the cost of capital
18 An interesting example is the Business Development Programme of Mexico 2001-2006,
which explicitly mentions quantitative targets. The programme proposes to create a public
evaluation system including strategic indicators, control and coordination mechanisms,
and participatory evaluation, periodic accountability and a monitoring unit for micro, small
and medium-sized enterprises, as an information source.
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goods and accelerated the adoption of  advanced technologies in frontier
sectors. New production technologies, involving an intensive use of  skilled
labour, undermined income distribution to the detriment of  workers without
tertiary education.
The outcome has been a rise in the rate of  unemployment from 6.9%
at the beginning of  the decade to 10.6% in 2003. The increase in
unemployment has occurred against the background of  an expansion in
the informal sector and a widening gap in the income of  formal and informal
workers. The result is a growing diversity in the labour market and a
deterioration in income distribution. In this context, the reduction in poverty
during the period 1990-2003 –from 48.3% of the population to 44.4%– is
due to a 60% increase in per capita social spending during the period.19
The emergence of  jobs with fixed-term contracts and temporary jobs
with no contract or no social protection, together with a drop in the wages
of  unskilled workers to the income levels of  the informal sector, aggravated
traditional employment problems. The active population faced an unstable
job situation, which eroded their development prospects, training incentives
and productivity gains. Social protection systems failed to cover these new
risks and, in addition, were affected by a shortage of  public funding and
new institutional mechanisms that linked social benefits to the job stability
of  each individual worker.
The current situation calls for more complex solutions, which go to
the very root of  employment problems and the ability of  social protection
mechanisms to cope with the new risk structure facing workers. The wide
variety of  proposed solutions call for active social and economic policies,
hinging on a social cohesion covenant resting on four pillars: consistency
with the foundations of macroeconomic policy; job creation; social
protection; and education and training.20  A social protection system should
be developed so that budgetary resources permitting, people can find a
new place in the job market after a short period of  unemployment or,
failing this, through the assistance provided by active labour-market-oriented
programmes. If, on the contrary, they remain in informal jobs, active job-
market-oriented programmes should seek to improve the productivity of
informal enterprises, adapt social protection systems to their characteristics
and promote their formalization through institutions that promote their
development.
19 The poverty level continues to be higher than it was in 1980 (40.5%) and 1997 (43.5%).




In order to achieve these objectives, authorities should introduce a
social cohesion covenant whose components match those illustrated in
figure 10 below. The continuous lines indicate workers’ mobility, the short
dotted lines indicate allocations of  resources, which must be strengthened
towards the informal sector, both in terms of  active programmes oriented
towards this segment of  the labour market and in terms of  adapting social
protection to its characteristics. The long dotted lines indicate solidarity-
based financing for protection systems under a fiscally responsible system.




Firstly, these measures must be consistent with the macroeconomic
context so as to avoid generating wage and price inflation. Additionally, it
would also be appropriate to open up a debate on the tax burden and the
tax yield. This should be reviewed in terms of  the capacity to generate
solidarity-based financing for socially acceptable protection targets.
Secondly, every effort should be made to ensure that the measures are
consistent with the new designs for social protection, which should offer
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service system, which should provide coverage in keeping with the new
risk profiles associated with changes in the production structure.
Thirdly, there should be consistency with active support programmes
for the generation of  employment, information systems, informal
productivity and training and skills development.
The covenant should be based on the recognition that labour policies
do not, on their own, generate employment. They imply a recovery in the
demand for employment and active labour policies to make sure that there
is a supply of  appropriate skills and to avoid other possible bottle necks.
Based on these criteria, labour flexibility without a rapid growth in demand
must go hand in hand with a good unemployment insurance coverage,
active public employment policies and support policies for the informal
sector. The covenant therefore combines the labour flexibility necessary
for workers to adapt to the new conditions for competitiveness in the global
market with a fiscally and socially responsible level of  economic protection
for workers. In order to formulate an agreement that takes into account
the current state of  development of  the social protection system and the
gradual development of  active policies directed towards the formal and
informal labour market, the proposal must be adjusted with variations that
match the context in which it is applied.
New technologies and work processes require increasing creativity,
initiative and versatility, and less specialization. Therefore, basic skills are
more important to develop than specific skills, if  workers are to have a
knowledge base that enables them to adapt better to new jobs, and if  the
cost of  greater flexibility in the labour market is not to fall entirely on
them.
In situations that feature increasing levels of  innovation and knowledge,
education prefigures the fate of  individuals and societies. Today’s patterns
of  production and the changes associated with globalization require human
resources trained for new modes of  interaction, work, production and
competition. Education is, thus, a requisite both for individuals to gain
access to the benefits of  progress, and for economies to ensure sustained
development through more highly knowledge-intensive competitiveness.
This means improving secondary school graduation rates, adapting the
educational system to the needs of  the labour market, and reducing
international and social gaps in the use of  information. Education has
considerable potential long-term effects on equity, but the condition for
them to materialize is that sufficient high-quality jobs be created. Education
and jobs are the key to economic growth with social equity (ECLAC, 2000a).
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(d) Institutional development and governance
Fourth, the relation between institutional design and functioning and
economic development is a two-way phenomenon. Some basic institutions
of  the economic system allow agents to be reasonably confident about
taking advantage of  the productive opportunities in the economy.21  At the
same time, the type and quality of  institutions are also a function of
economic development, both because of  the increasing complexity of  the
economy and because more resources are available. More important, yet,
the perception of  opportunities for economic growth leads to building
and redesigning institutions. In various circumstances, it has been observed
that institutional change does not emerge from a diffuse notion that reform
is necessary, but from precise incentives and from the will to follow a specific
economic trajectory that seems promising. Having a perspective on
development makes it possible to identify priorities and define interests in
such a way that the motivating factors behind certain institutional actions
or changes become clear, and their implementation is facilitated. Hence, it
is not only that economic development requires institutional changes, but
that the crucial institutions function on the basis of  the expected course
of  the growth. The current process of  globalization is a good example of
the exigencies of  development and the adaptation of  institutions, as shown
at the beginning of  this summary.
Beyond the greater or lesser depth of  reforms, institutional functioning
depends on experience and lessons that require a medium-term
perspective.22  One requirement is obviously macroeconomic stability –that
is, achieving some degree of  consistency between expectations and the
actual performance of  the economy. When agents have a realistic and
reasonably specific view of  the direction of  the economy, crises are less
likely to develop. At the same time, investment is more likely to be well
placed –and this includes investment to develop capacities and reputation,
which tend to strengthen institutions.
21 Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) draw an interesting distinction between types of
institutions. Basic institutions are those that are created by the market. Without them, the
market would not exist, or would not function well. However, long-term economic
development requires other groups of institutions—those that regulate certain markets
(where externalities, economies of scale and imperfect information are present), guarantee
macroeconomic stability (foreign exchange, monetary and fiscal institutions), and confer
social legitimacy (social protection systems, unemployment insurance and social funds).
22 Dixit (2004) maintains that the best strategy is not to attempt to reproduce the institutions
of developed countries, but rather to modify those that already exist in each country.
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Open regionalism, in the terms proposed by ECLAC (1994) is an
option that can moderate some of  the dilemmas mentioned above in relation
to competition in the global economy. Indeed, in the 1990s, the four
imperfect customs unions in the region generated intra-regional trade, as
well as the potential for cooperation on various fronts. Toward the end of
the decade, however, the process stagnated, while some countries (first
Mexico, then Chile) began to favour free trade agreements to ensure access
to certain markets in developed and developing countries. Because of
changes in the Free Trade Area of  the Americas negotiations, other countries
(Central American and some Andean Community countries) are adopting
similar strategies. In this context, subregional blocks face the choice of
either strengthening their economic unions or moving, collectively or
individually, into multiple free trade agreements with the rest of  the world.
In the latter case, the significance of  existing blocks would be seriously
affected.
IV. Some strategic guidelines for public intervention
Any thinking regarding Latin America and the Caribbean must begin
by recognizing the great differences among the countries that make up the
region, and the need to respect their unique characteristics. Nevertheless,
there are common features that make it worthwhile to think about the
countries as a whole, while bearing in mind that these are general principles
and require significant complementary adjustment before being applied to
specific circumstances in individual countries. In essence, the task is to
define a “roadmap” that articulates public policy in different areas, while
taking into consideration the specific present situation.
First, dissatisfaction with the results of  the 1990s reforms, in terms
of  economic growth and social equity, is leading to an alternative vision.
The change can be summarized conceptually as a transition, from an
approach that advocated more market and less State to one that, without
denying achievement in developing market economies, places renewed
emphasis on better government –that is, on interventions of  higher quality.
Second, a new balance must be reached between private initiative and
public interest, paying special attention to equal opportunity and social
cohesion. In a number of  the region’s countries, many citizens and social
groups have been losing their sense of  belonging, along with ability to
see common objectives as their own. Overcoming these centrifugal
tendencies requires “society creation”, as well as more active participation
in democratic political institutions, more tolerance for differences and
greater willingness to compromise. With this object in mind, public policy
must regain its original sense, addressing all types of  decision-making in
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pursuit of  the common interest, not restricting itself  to today’s most
common meaning of  State action, that is, making “others” responsible.
Third, the foregoing is made easier when there is a shared vision of
how to create an inclusive future. In all of  the region’s countries, there
have always been marked differences regarding the well-being of  their
inhabitants. However, in a number of  cases, during more or less prolonged
periods, there was a perception that there existed the possibility of  a better
future, based on people’s own efforts and within the framework of  the
opportunities that society offered. Today, the situation is different and
requires a mobilization of  social energies around a common endeavour, in
order to establish long-term agreements (explicit or implicit) between the
State and political and social actors regarding objectives, and the set of
policies and innovations needed to achieve them. These agreements must
be based on mutual commitments, particularly in the case of  the business
sector, and not merely on a unilateral attempt to gain rent-seeking
concessions from the State.
Fourth, the countries of  the region have a more diverse productive
structure than they did in the past and than other developing economies
such as those of  East Asia. This situation can be represented, in diagrammatic
form, through a “three-speed” economic model, based on the size and legal
constitution of  enterprises that make up the economy. One group is composed
of  informal enterprises that, because of  their structure and capacity, are of
lower productivity and operate in an environment that offers them little
opportunity for development and learning. The second group is made up of
formal small and medium-sized enterprises which, in turn, have problems
accessing resources (particularly financial) and gaining access to certain
markets for factors of  production that would allow them to develop their
ability to compete. The final group consists of  large national and foreign
enterprises, whose productivity often rivals that of  businesses operating on
the global scale,  but with few links to the rest of  the domestic economy and,
in some cases, with poor capacity for innovation.
Fifth, as is true in the international arena, asymmetries —
macroeconomic and financial, productive and technological, and of
different degrees of  mobility of  productive factors— that characterize the
relation between developed and developing countries, tend to reproduce
and amplify inequalities. Moreover, at the national level there is a lack of
genuine equality of  opportunity that would allow ventures of  the different
productive entities mentioned to prosper on an equal basis. Proactive public
policy is therefore needed to level the playing field, through specific
measures designed to eliminate the obstacles that unevenly affect different
productive units.
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A differentiated structure of  support and incentives could bring
together three major public strategies: inclusion, modernization and
densification. The strategy of  inclusion is designed to move as many small
productive units as possible from the informal to the formal sector of  the
economy. The policies that make up this strategy have broad coverage, but
are also selective in terms of  their beneficiaries, based on a definition,
adjusted for each country, of  the productive units to which they are directed.
Notable among these policies are the simplification of  rules and
administrative procedures, lower tax liabilities, with simpler declaration
procedures, expanded access to credit for small investments (and, above
all, for working capital), and basic training programmes in management
and technology skills. By moving businesses into the formal sector of  the
economy, they will be able to access other public policies and instruments,
making it possible to advance their businesses, while providing a degree of
social protection to their workers.
The modernization strategy is based on horizontal policies, combined
with selective measures directed at productive clusters or specific productive
chains. Support for modernizing production includes horizontal policies
designed to improve access to information, credit, technology and marketing
systems. Exporting can be enhanced through services offering guidance
on foreign markets and available support, provided by specialized public
agencies in association with private-sector business associations. Added to
these are other policies involving training activities, incorporation of
improvements in production, technology and procurement of  new
machinery and equipment. The selective policies are aimed at promoting
the development of  links with small and medium-sized enterprises
(“associativity”), fostering links with larger businesses and strengthening
local production structures or specific production chains. In several
countries there are policies of  both these types in place, but there is a need
for major improvements in their design, for participation on the part of
the potential beneficiaries, for establishing follow-up and assessment
mechanisms and, above all, for increasing their coverage.
This last strategy can be summarized by the concept of  “densification,”
since it aims to incorporate more knowledge in the national productive
landscape, as well as to establish a more articulated web of  productive,
technological, entrepreneurial and labour relations. In principle, the overall
policy and proper functioning of  the institutions within a market economy
would allow large businesses, which are more closely linked to international
markets, to operate under reasonable conditions. Ideally, however, this
framework should be supplemented by specific measures designed to
produce changes in the public interest. In this case, it involves strategic
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–and, therefore, highly selective– measures that require public officials to
exercise a high degree of  skill in negotiating and persuasion, in order to
mobilize private efforts. This strategy can: provide implementation, through
a variety of  programmes, including programmes aimed at strengthening
links within the export base; foster public-private cooperation in specific
areas of  innovation in order to realize potential competitive advantages;
attract higher-quality foreign investment for productive links and
technological capacities; support the expansion and internationalization
of  domestic enterprises; and strengthen the services infrastructure, in order
to eliminate bottlenecks in productive development.
Sixth, the adoption of  differentiated strategies, such as those referred
to earlier, requires a considerable increase in the transparency of  public
policy. This will strengthen its legitimacy and provide for major
improvements in design, based on a fruitful interaction with the potential
beneficiaries. It is also necessary, in the interest of  greater transparency
and effectiveness, to implement follow-up and assessment mechanisms
that make it possible to learn from successes and failures and, as a result,
re-plot the course or make adjustments in order to achieve the objectives
that have been outlined. Together these requirements point to the
importance of  improving the functioning of  democratic institutions, as
well as the quality of  government officials overseeing strategic areas. This
task can be met successfully, as demonstrated by the progress that various
countries have achieved with technical teams dealing with monetary and
fiscal issues.
Seventh, the policy instruments in an open economy are fewer and of
more limited scope than those used in semi-closed economies. International
regulations, free trade agreements and a number of  regional agreements
restrict the use of  many such measures that were commonly used in the
past. At the same time, budgetary and financial constraints make it necessary
to be more selective in their application. Thus, the incentives will certainly
be more moderate than those of  past eras, particularly the strong incentives
that characterized the period of  industrialization overseen by the State,
including quantitative or tariff  restrictions on the importation of  specific
goods and the channelling of  vast amounts of  fiscal resources to public
enterprises operating in sectors considered strategic for national
development. All of  this requires a targeting of  efforts, increased efficiency
and, above all, identifying new ways of  making public policy.
As a final thought, it is worth noting that economic growth is
simultaneously a condition and a consequence of  the foregoing. However,
it seems impossible to imagine not undertaking major efforts to increase
domestic savings and channel them more effectively to productive
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investment. Although developing economies should be the recipients of
foreign savings, one of  the most disruptive factors to economic decisions
in recent years has been the variability in the supply of  international
financing. Thus, it would be wise to rely more on countries’ own strengths,
rather than depending exclusively on those of  countries outside the region.
Similarly, it is vital to establish a new fiscal covenant for social cohesion
that financially supports the public functions required by productive
transformation accompanied by social equity, in the framework of  market
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